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Chapter II – Operating conditions for investment firms 
 
Article 21 – Regular review of conditions for initial authorisation 
1. Member States shall require that an investment firm authorised in their territory comply at all times 
with the conditions for initial authorisation established in Chapter I. 
2.   Member States shall require competent authorities to establish the appropriate methods to monitor 
that investment firms comply with their obligation under paragraph 1. They shall require investment 
firms to notify the competent authorities of any material changes to the conditions for initial 
authorisation. 
ESMA may develop guidelines regarding the monitoring methods referred to in this paragraph. 
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I. General Features 
Purpose 
1 Article 21 of MiFID II aims to safeguard effective supervision of investment 
firms. 
II. Comment 
2 MiFID II requires investment firms to comply on an ongoing basis with their 
authorisation requirements. The competent authorities1 of the Member States 
must establish appropriate methods to monitor investment firms’ compliance 
with the requirements of MiFID II. The monitoring methods were left to the 
discretion of the Member States under MiFID I, provided that the methods were 
suitable for effective supervision. Under Art 21 of MiFID II, investment firms 
contribute to effective supervision by notifying competent authorities of any 
material changes to the conditions needed for initial authorisation. When such 
a change is considered ‘material’ is not answered by Art 21. Under MiFID I, 
whether a change would be considered material was determined by the 
relevant competent authority. Under MiFID II, the European Securities and 
Markets Authority (ESMA) is empowered to develop guidelines regarding 
monitoring methods. Recital 44 of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation2 indicates 
that outsourcing investment services or critical and important functions is 
capable of constituting a material change pursuant to Art 21(2).  
 
Article 22 – General obligation in respect of on-going supervision 
Member States shall ensure that the competent authorities monitor the activities of investment firms so 
as to assess compliance with the operating conditions provided for in this Directive. Member States 
shall ensure that the appropriate measures are in place to enable the competent authorities to obtain 
the information needed to assess the compliance of investment firms with those obligations. 
 
                                            
1  Article 4(1)(26) of MiFID II. 
2  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565 of 25.4.2016 supplementing Directive 
2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards organisational 
requirements and operating conditions for investment firms and defined terms for the purposes 
of that Directive (OJ EU, L 87/1). 
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Article 23 – Conflicts of interest 
1.   Member States shall require investment firms to take all appropriate steps to identify and to prevent 
or manage conflicts of interest between themselves, including their managers, employees and tied 
agents, or any person directly or indirectly linked to them by control and their clients or between one 
client and another that arise in the course of providing any investment and ancillary services, or 
combinations thereof, including those caused by the receipt of inducements from third parties or by the 
investment firm’s own remuneration and other incentive structures. 
2.   Where organisational or administrative arrangements made by the investment firm in accordance 
with Article 16(3) to prevent conflicts of interest from adversely affecting the interest of its client are not 
sufficient to ensure, with reasonable confidence, that risks of damage to client interests will be 
prevented, the investment firm shall clearly disclose to the client the general nature and/or sources of 
conflicts of interest and the steps taken to mitigate those risks before undertaking business on its behalf. 
3.   The disclosure referred to in paragraph 2 shall: 
(a) be made in a durable medium; and 
(b) include sufficient detail, taking into account the nature of the client, to enable that client to take an 
informed decision with respect to the service in the context of which the conflict of interest arises. 
4.   The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 89 to: 
(a) define the steps that investment firms might reasonably be expected to take to identify, prevent, 
manage and disclose conflicts of interest when providing various investment and ancillary 
services and combinations thereof; 
(b) establish appropriate criteria for determining the types of conflict of interest whose existence may 
damage the interests of the clients or potential clients of the investment firm. 
 
I. General Features 
1. Purpose 
1 Conflicts of interest have the potential to disrupt the proper functioning of 
markets. Article 23 of MiFID II is intended to ensure, in particular, that 
investment firms are organised so that client interests are not adversely 
affected by conflicts of interest between the different activities of investment 
firms and the interests of their clients.3 The key element of MiFID II’s framework 
for addressing conflicts of interest is management and avoidance of 
conflicts; disclosure is a measure of last resort and not a means for managing 
                                            
3  Commission, MiFID I proposal, 19 November 2002, COM(2002) 625 final, 19. 
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conflicts of interest.4 MiFID II significantly strengthens the conflicts-of-interest 
regulatory regime with respect to remuneration of staff and third-party 
payments and benefits. Even though Art 23 of MiFID II does not form part of 
MiFID II’s section on investor protection, mitigating conflicts of interest is central 
to investor protection.5 
2. Level 2 and 3 Measures 
2 Relevant level 2 measures may be found in the following articles of the MiFID 
II Delegated Regulation: Art 27 (remuneration policies and practices), Art 33 
(conflicts of interest potentially detrimental to a client), Art 34 (conflicts of 
interest policy), Art 38 (additional general requirements in relation to 
underwriting or placing), Art 39 (additional requirements in relation to pricing of 
offerings in relation to issuance of financial instruments), Art 40 (additional 
requirements in relation to placing), Art 41 (additional requirements in relation 
to advice, distribution and self-placement), Art 42 (additional requirements in 
relation to lending or provision of credit in the context of underwriting or 
placement), and Art 43 (record keeping in relation to underwriting or placing). 
II. General (Art 23(1)) 
3 MiFID II abstains from providing a general definition of what constitutes a 
conflict of interest. The MiFID II Delegated Regulation comes close to providing 
a definition by stating in its Recital 45 that conflicts of interest typically arise 
when there is a conflict between the interests of the firm, or certain persons 
connected to the firm or the firm's group, and the interests of a client to whom 
the firm owes a duty; or when there is a conflict among the differing interests of 
two or more clients to whom the firm owes a duty. Recital 45 does not specify 
further what kind of duty a firm owes to a client, but it must be a duty to act in 
the interest of the client.6 The duty referred to may be a fiduciary duty arising 
under contract or other national or EU law, as well as a duty imposed under 
                                            
4  Commission, Public consultation: review of MiFID, 8 December 2010, 6. 
5  Stefan Grundmann and Philipp Hacker, ‘Conflicts of interest’ in Danny Busch and Guido 
Ferrarini (eds), Regulation of EU financial markets: MiFID II (Oxford University Press 2017) 
para 7.11. 
6  For further discussion see Christoph Kumpan and Patrick C. Leyens, ‘Conflicts of interest of 
financial intermediaries’ (2008) European Company and Financial Law Review 72, 83-84. 
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MiFID II.7 A conflict of interest does not arise merely because a firm may gain 
a benefit unless there is potential harm to a client, nor because one client to 
whom the firm owes a duty may make a gain or avoid a loss, unless there is a 
concomitant potential loss for another client.8 
4 Article 23 of MiFID II does not prohibit conflicts of interest. Instead, conflicts 
must be identified, prevented or managed, and disclosed. The corresponding 
‘organisational requirement’ is Art 16(3) of MiFID II. Risks posed by conflicts of 
interest are further addressed by the MiFID II provisions governing 
remuneration (Art 24(10)) and third-party payments and benefits (Art 24(9)). 
The general principle of fair treatment in Art 24(1) also implicitly contains an 
obligation to avoid conflicts of interest. Preventing conflicts of interest is also 
one of the core responsibilities of the management body of an investment firm 
under Art 9(3). The rules to manage conflicts-of-interest apply to dealings with 
all clients of the relevant investment firm. Article 23(1) requires firms to take all 
‘appropriate steps’ to identify and to prevent or manage conflicts of interests 
that arise in the course of providing investment services. It follows that firms 
must not go to disproportionate lengths to manage conflicts of interest, and that 
firms may take into account the nature of their business (including the services 
and financial instruments they offer), as well as the level of risk that conflicts of 
interest may adversely affect their clients.9 Article 23(1) also expressly states 
that conflicts of interest may be caused by receiving inducements from third 
parties, or by a firm’s own remuneration and other incentive structures. 
5 The requirements set forth by Art 23 are kept at a high level of abstraction and 
do not address any particular conflicts of interest generated by particular 
investment services. Each investment firm is required to take appropriate steps 
to manage its conflicts of interest based on its particular conflicts of interest risk 
profile. Portfolio management services, for example, generate significant 
conflicts of interest with respect to churning, front running and preferential 
treatment of more affluent clients. Article 33 of the MiFID II Delegated 
Regulation specifies situations which are potentially detrimental to a client and 
                                            
7  Commission, Background note to draft MiFID I Implementing Directive, 6 February 2006, 6.1. 
8  Recital 45 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
9  Jonathan Herbst, A practitioner’s guide to MiFID II (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) 94. 
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which an investment firm must take into account for the purpose of identifying 
conflicts of interest. Particular conflicts of interest that may arise in relation to 
specific investment services are also addressed by the MiFID II Delegated 
Regulation with respect to investment firms providing underwriting services or 
placing financial instruments (see Arts 38 through 43 of the MiFID II Delegated 
Regulation). These last-mentioned provisions ensure that the interests of 
investment firms or of their other clients do not improperly influence the quality 
of services provided to the issuer client.10 
6 An investment firm must establish, implement and maintain an effective 
conflicts-of-interest policy. A firms must periodically assess and review, at 
least annually, its conflicts-of-interest policy and take all appropriate measures 
to address any deficiencies.11 Article 34 of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation 
further requires certain content to be included in a policy and identifies 
procedures and measures which are necessary for a firm to ensure the 
requisite degree of independence that is appropriate considering its business 
activities, membership in a group of companies, and the risks faced by its 
clients. At a minimum, a conflicts-of-interest policy must identify the 
circumstances which constitute or may give rise to detrimental conflicts of 
interest, and it must specify procedures to be followed and measures to be 
adopted in order to prevent or manage such conflicts.12 Article 34(3) of the 
MiFID II Delegated Regulation contains a non-exhaustive list of the procedures 
to be followed and measures to be adopted when it is necessary to ensure an 
appropriate degree of independence. An investment firm must pay special 
attention to certain activities in its policy if it, or a person directly or indirectly 
linked by control to the firm, performs a combination of two or more of the 
following activities: investment research and advice, proprietary trading, 
portfolio management and corporate finance business.13  
                                            
10  Recital 57 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
11  Art 34(1), (5) MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
12  Art 34(2) MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
13  Recital 47 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
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III. Disclosure (Arts 23(2) and (3)) 
1 Article 23(2) of MiFID II contains a disclosure requirement where the 
organisational and administrative measures taken by an investment firm in 
accordance with Art 16(3) of MiFID II are not sufficient to ensure ‘with 
reasonable confidence’ that risks of damage to clients’ interests would be 
prevented. Article 34(4) subparagraph 2 of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation 
further specifies the content of the required disclosure. Article 23(3)(b) requires 
disclosures to be sufficiently detailed in order to enable a client, considering 
the nature of the client, to make an informed decision with respect to the 
investment service in question before conducting business with the firm. A 
disclosure must clearly state that the organisational and administrative 
arrangements established by the relevant investment firm to prevent or manage 
the conflict of interest are not sufficient to ensure, with reasonable confidence, 
that the risks of damage to the interests of the client will be prevented.14 A 
disclosure must include a specific description of the conflict or conflicts of 
interest that arise with respect to the investment service in question. This 
description must explain the general nature and sources of any conflict of 
interest, as well as the risks to the client resulting from a conflict of interest and 
the steps undertaken to mitigate these risks.15 The disclosure must be sufficient 
for the average client within the relevant category of clients (e.g. professional 
or retail clients), not necessarily sufficient for a specific client, to make an 
informed decision with respect to a service. This interpretation of Art 23(3)(b) 
might be questioned, since the provisions refers to ‘that client’, indicating a 
greater need to personalise disclosures.16 Yet, Art 23(3)(b) also refers to the 
‘the nature of the client’, which means the professional or retail nature of a client 
and  indicates that it is not necessary to consider a specific client’s capability. 
The disclosure must mention and describe the specific conflicts of interest that 
would arise for the relevant type of client and specific investment service. It 
                                            
14  Art 34(4) subpara 2 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
15  Art 34(4) subpara 2 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
16  Stefan Grundmann and Philipp Hacker, ‘Conflicts of interest’ in Danny Busch and Guido 
Ferrarini (eds), Regulation of EU financial markets: MiFID II (Oxford University Press 2017) 
paras 7.49-7.52. 
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would be insufficient if a firm were to list all conflicts of interest that generally 
arise from its business across all client types and in respect of all services. 
2 Like the MiFID I Implementing Directive, Arts 34(4) and (5) of the MiFID II 
Delegated Regulation favour ex-ante procedural controls over disclosure: 
Disclosure is a measure of last resort and over-reliance on disclosure would 
be considered a deficiency in an investment firm’s conflicts-of-interest policy. 
Explicitly stating the principle that disclosure is to be a last resort aims to deter 
firms from over-relying on disclosure without adequately considering how 
conflicts of interest can be appropriately managed. What is considered as over-
reliance is, however, not yet clarified at European level. 
 
Foreword 
1 Articles 24 through 30 contain MiFID II’s harmonised regime for investor 
protection. The aim of the articles is to ensure an appropriate level of 
protection for investors, and to enhance the investor protection provided by 
MiFID I. Enhancing investor protection also supports MiFID II’s ‘passporting’ 
regime, which is based on the principle of home-country supervision. Without 
such harmonisation, Member States could derogate from norms and undermine 
the free movement rights of investment firms.17 Further, the investor protection 
measures ensure that investment firms conduct their business in a manner that 
sustains overall market integrity and efficiency.18 Conduct that increases risk, 
or appears to, for clients may lead to loss of investor confidence19 and, thus, 
may affect the efficient functioning of financial markets. Compared to MiFID I, 
there is only a small number of macro changes (e.g. product governance, see 
below paragraph 7 under Art 24), but a large number of micro changes which, 
taken together, significantly reform the regulatory regime for investor 
protection. Similarly, the investor protection measures in the MiFID II Delegated 
                                            
17  cf Commission, MiFID I proposal, 19 November 2002, COM(2002) 625 final, 23; Recitals 2, 3 
MiFID II. 
18  Commission, MiFID I proposal, 19 November 2002, COM(2002) 625 final, 28. 
19  Recital 5 MiFID II. 
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Regulation and the MiFID II Delegated Directive20 build, to a large extent, on 
the obligations created by the 2006 MiFID I Implementing Directive, and 
selectively improve the latter directive. The new regime for investor protection, 
in particular the improved protection of professional clients and the product 
governance regime, is also a response to the most recent financial crisis and 
mis-selling scandals which were not prevented by MiFID I.21 According to 
Recital 70 of MiFID II, the increasing complexity of financial services and 
instruments requires enhancing regulatory obligations for investment firms.  
2 MiFID II’s investor protection regulations primarily address market failures22 
that exist in retail markets using product design, distribution and disclosure 
rules. The changes to the protections for investors are particularly concerned 
with the distribution process and product governance, and may reflect 
experiences and (behavioural) research about the limits of disclosures in 
securing good investor outcomes.23 Empirical studies on retail investor 
competence and decision-making show that retail investors in the EU are 
typically unsophisticated, have poor decision-making skills, struggle to 
understand disclosures and suffer from information overload, behavioural 
weaknesses and biases.24 Yet, MiFID II only addresses these issues in the 
retail investment markets to a limited extent. The issue of information overload 
is rather exacerbated by MiFID II. For example, the improvements to the 
financial-advice regulatory regime are built on the traditional disclosure 
                                            
20  Commission Delegated Directive (EU) 2017/593 of 7.4.2016 supplementing Directive 
2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to safeguarding of 
financial instruments and funds belonging to clients, product governance obligations and the 
rules applicable to the provision or reception of fees, commissions or any monetary or non-
monetary benefits (OJ EU, L 87/500) 
21  Recitals 4, 5 MiFID II; ESMA/EBA/EIOPA, Joint Position on Manufacturer’s Product Oversight 
& Governance Processes, November 2013, JC-2013-77, Annex 1; ESMA, Consultation paper: 
Draft guidelines on MiFID II product governance requirements, 5 October 2016, 
ESMA/2016/1436, 4, 17. For concerns about the quality of investment advice under MiFID I’s 
regime see Synovate, Consumer Market Study on Advice within the Area of Retail Investment 
Services—Final Report, 2011. 
22  For an overview see John Campbell et al, ‘Consumer Financial Protection’ (2011) 25 J Econ 
Perspectives 91-114; Niamh Moloney, EU securities and financial markets regulation (3rd edn, 
Oxford University Press 2014) 770-771. 
23  On the limits of disclosure see Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider, More than you wanted to 
know: the failure of mandated disclosure (Princeton University Press 2014). 
24  BME Consulting, The EU market for consumer long-term retail savings vehicles, Final Report, 
15 November 2007, 15; Decision Technology et al, Consumer decision-making in retail 
investment services: a behavioural economics perspective, Final Report, November 2010, 6-8. 
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concepts, and are intended to provide investors with all relevant information 
(see Recital 72 of MiFID II). MiFID II’s ignorance of behavioural research is all 
the more surprising since the key investor information documents for UCITS25 
and for PRIIPs26 target limited investor competence and decision-making skills. 
Whereas the UCITS and PRIIPs regulations collectively attempt to establish an 
effective disclosure scheme for retail markets by introducing summary 
disclosure documents, informed by behavioural research and with a focus on 
presentation and design, MiFID II’s disclosure regime primarily identifies the 
types of disclosure which must be provided to clients. The enhanced 
disclosure requirements under MiFID II illustrate that mandated disclosure 
remains a key part of the investor protection framework.  
3 The conduct-of-business rules apply to investment firms when they deal with 
retail or professional clients, unless the relevant provision specifies that it only 
applies in respect of retail clients (e.g. Art 25(6) below). Investment firms may, 
on their own initiative or at the request of a client, treat a person or entity 
otherwise defined as a professional client as a retail client (see Art 45(3)(b) 
MiFID II Delegated Regulation). 
4 The MiFID II regulatory regime for investor protection does not obligate Member 
States to provide for civil law sanctions, with the exception of a single provision 
on private enforcement (see Art 75 below). Neither does MiFID II prohibit civil 
liability under national law in cases when an investment firm infringes its 
conduct-of-business rules. MiFID II does not harmonise the conditions for 
civil liability if an investment firm fails to comply with conduct-of-business 
rules, which is left to each Member State’s civil law rules.27 The CJEU has not 
yet answered if, and in what way, the conduct-of-business rules affect the 
conditions of civil liability when Member States decide to provide contractual 
remedies for non-compliance with MiFID II’s conduct-of-business rules. The 
text of MiFID II is silent on this matter. Private law duties have not been 
                                            
25  Art 78 of Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13.7.2009 on 
the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for 
collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) (OJ EU, L 302/32). 
26  Art 5(1) of Regulation (EU) No. 1286/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26.11.2014 on key information documents for packaged retail and insurance-based investment 
products (PRIIPs) (OJ EU, L 352/1). 
27  For MiFID I: Case C-604/11 Genil v Bankinter ECLI:EU:C:2013:344 para 57. 
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superseded by the investor-protection rules under MiFID II because the 
harmonisation of private law is outside the scope of MiFID II.28 Further, private 
law duties owed by investment firms do not automatically follow regulatory 
duties since the former are principally determined by each Member State 
autonomously based on private law standards. Yet, it is not convincing that the 
balance between the interests of investment firms and their clients should be 
different only because a duty in one case stems from public law and in another 
case from private law. The private law standards should, therefore, be made 
more specific in such a way that legislative decisions regarding the content, 
scope and form of conduct-of-business rules under MiFID II must at least be 
taken into account. The conduct-of-business rules (indirectly) affect the scope 
and content of the private law duties. There are no private law principles which 
prohibit taking into account rules set out by MiFID II. In practice, private law 
duties will usually be consistent with investor protection rules under MiFID II. In 
individual cases, the private law duties may be more or less demanding than 
the public law duties.29 
 
Article 24 – General principles and information to clients 
1.   Member States shall require that, when providing investment services or, where appropriate, 
ancillary services to clients, an investment firm act honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance 
with the best interests of its clients and comply, in particular, with the principles set out in this Article 
and in Article 25. 
2.   Investment firms which manufacture financial instruments for sale to clients shall ensure that those 
financial instruments are designed to meet the needs of an identified target market of end clients within 
the relevant category of clients, the strategy for distribution of the financial instruments is compatible 
with the identified target market, and the investment firm takes reasonable steps to ensure that the 
financial instrument is distributed to the identified target market. 
An investment firm shall understand the financial instruments they offer or recommend, assess the 
compatibility of the financial instruments with the needs of the clients to whom it provides investment 
services, also taking account of the identified target market of end clients as referred to in Article 16(3), 
and ensure that financial instruments are offered or recommended only when this is in the interest of 
the client. 
                                            
28  The Commission’s proposal to introduce a principle of civil liability of investment service 
providers in MiFID II (Commission, Public consultation: review of MiFID, 8 December 2010, 63) 
has not been adopted. 
29  Martin Brenncke, Regelung der Werbung im Bank- und Kapitalmarktrecht (Schulthess & 
Nomos 2013) 1041-1047. 
Martin Brenncke  13 
3.   All information, including marketing communications, addressed by the investment firm to clients or 
potential clients shall be fair, clear and not misleading. Marketing communications shall be clearly 
identifiable as such. 
4.   Appropriate information shall be provided in good time to clients or potential clients with regard to 
the investment firm and its services, the financial instruments and proposed investment strategies, 
execution venues and all costs and related charges. That information shall include the following: 
(a) when investment advice is provided, the investment firm must, in good time before it provides 
investment advice, inform the client: 
(i) whether or not the advice is provided on an independent basis; 
(ii) whether the advice is based on a broad or on a more restricted analysis of different types of 
financial instruments and, in particular, whether the range is limited to financial instruments 
issued or provided by entities having close links with the investment firm or any other legal 
or economic relationships, such as contractual relationships, so close as to pose a risk of 
impairing the independent basis of the advice provided; 
(iii) whether the investment firm will provide the client with a periodic assessment of the 
suitability of the financial instruments recommended to that client; 
 
(b) the information on financial instruments and proposed investment strategies must include 
appropriate guidance on and warnings of the risks associated with investments in those 
instruments or in respect of particular investment strategies and whether the financial instrument 
is intended for retail or professional clients, taking account of the identified target market in 
accordance with paragraph 2; 
(c) the information on all costs and associated charges must include information relating to both 
investment and ancillary services, including the cost of advice, where relevant, the cost of the 
financial instrument recommended or marketed to the client and how the client may pay for it, also 
encompassing any third-party payments. 
The information about all costs and charges, including costs and charges in connection with the 
investment service and the financial instrument, which are not caused by the occurrence of underlying 
market risk, shall be aggregated to allow the client to understand the overall cost as well as the 
cumulative effect on return of the investment, and where the client so requests, an itemised breakdown 
shall be provided. Where applicable, such information shall be provided to the client on a regular basis, 
at least annually, during the life of the investment. 
5.   The information referred to in paragraphs 4 and 9 shall be provided in a comprehensible form in 
such a manner that clients or potential clients are reasonably able to understand the nature and risks 
of the investment service and of the specific type of financial instrument that is being offered and, 
consequently, to take investment decisions on an informed basis. Member States may allow that 
information to be provided in a standardised format. 
6.   Where an investment service is offered as part of a financial product which is already subject to 
other provisions of Union law relating to credit institutions and consumer credits with respect to 
information requirements, that service shall not be additionally subject to the obligations set out in 
paragraphs 3, 4 and 5. 
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7.   Where an investment firm informs the client that investment advice is provided on an independent 
basis, that investment firm shall: 
(a) assess a sufficient range of financial instruments available on the market which must be 
sufficiently diverse with regard to their type and issuers or product providers to ensure that the 
client’s investment objectives can be suitably met and must not be limited to financial instruments 
issued or provided by: 
(i) the investment firm itself or by entities having close links with the investment firm; or 
(ii) other entities with which the investment firm has such close legal or economic relationships, 
such as contractual relationships, as to pose a risk of impairing the independent basis of the 
advice provided; 
 
(b) not accept and retain fees, commissions or any monetary or non-monetary benefits paid or 
provided by any third party or a person acting on behalf of a third party in relation to the provision 
of the service to clients. Minor non-monetary benefits that are capable of enhancing the quality of 
service provided to a client and are of a scale and nature such that they could not be judged to 
impair compliance with the investment firm’s duty to act in the best interest of the client must be 
clearly disclosed and are excluded from this point. 
8.   When providing portfolio management the investment firm shall not accept and retain fees, 
commissions or any monetary or non-monetary benefits paid or provided by any third party or a person 
acting on behalf of a third party in relation to the provision of the service to clients. Minor non-monetary 
benefits that are capable of enhancing the quality of service provided to a client and are of a scale and 
nature such that they could not be judged to impair compliance with the investment firm’s duty to act in 
the best interest of the client shall be clearly disclosed and are excluded from this paragraph. 
9.   Member States shall ensure that investment firms are regarded as not fulfilling their obligations 
under Article 23 or under paragraph 1 of this Article where they pay or are paid any fee or commission, 
or provide or are provided with any non-monetary benefit in connection with the provision of an 
investment service or an ancillary service, to or by any party except the client or a person on behalf of 
the client, other than where the payment or benefit: 
(a) is designed to enhance the quality of the relevant service to the client; and 
(b) does not impair compliance with the investment firm’s duty to act honestly, fairly and professionally 
in accordance with the best interest of its clients. 
The existence, nature and amount of the payment or benefit referred to in the first subparagraph, or, 
where the amount cannot be ascertained, the method of calculating that amount, must be clearly 
disclosed to the client, in a manner that is comprehensive, accurate and understandable, prior to the 
provision of the relevant investment or ancillary service. Where applicable, the investment firm shall 
also inform the client on mechanisms for transferring to the client the fee, commission, monetary or 
non-monetary benefit received in relation to the provision of the investment or ancillary service. 
The payment or benefit which enables or is necessary for the provision of investment services, such as 
custody costs, settlement and exchange fees, regulatory levies or legal fees, and which by its nature 
cannot give rise to conflicts with the investment firm’s duties to act honestly, fairly and professionally in 
accordance with the best interests of its clients, is not subject to the requirements set out in the first 
subparagraph. 
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10.   An investment firm which provides investment services to clients shall ensure that it does not 
remunerate or assess the performance of its staff in a way that conflicts with its duty to act in the best 
interests of its clients. In particular, it shall not make any arrangement by way of remuneration, sales 
targets or otherwise that could provide an incentive to its staff to recommend a particular financial 
instrument to a retail client when the investment firm could offer a different financial instrument which 
would better meet that client’s needs. 
11.   When an investment service is offered together with another service or product as part of a 
package or as a condition for the same agreement or package, the investment firm shall inform the 
client whether it is possible to buy the different components separately and shall provide for a separate 
evidence of the costs and charges of each component. 
Where the risks resulting from such an agreement or package offered to a retail client are likely to be 
different from the risks associated with the components taken separately, the investment firm shall 
provide an adequate description of the different components of the agreement or package and the way 
in which its interaction modifies the risks. 
ESMA, in cooperation with EBA and EIOPA, shall develop by 3 January 2016, and update periodically, 
guidelines for the assessment and the supervision of cross-selling practices indicating, in particular, 
situations in which cross-selling practices are not compliant with obligations laid down in paragraph 1. 
12.   Member States may, in exceptional cases, impose additional requirements on investment firms in 
respect of the matters covered by this Article. Such requirements must be objectively justified and 
proportionate so as to address specific risks to investor protection or to market integrity which are of 
particular importance in the circumstances of the market structure of that Member State. 
Member States shall notify the Commission of any requirement which they intend to impose in 
accordance with this paragraph without undue delay and at least two months before the date appointed 
for that requirement to come into force. The notification shall include a justification for that requirement. 
Any such additional requirements shall not restrict or otherwise affect the rights of investment firms 
under Articles 34 and 35 of this Directive. 
The Commission shall within two months from the notification referred to in the second subparagraph 
provide its opinion on the proportionality of and justification for the additional requirements. 
The Commission shall communicate to Member States and make public on its website the additional 
requirements imposed in accordance with this paragraph. 
Member States may retain additional requirements that were notified to the Commission in accordance 
with Article 4 of Directive 2006/73/EC before 2 July 2014 provided that the conditions laid down in that 
Article are met. 
13.   The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 89 to 
ensure that investment firms comply with the principles set out in this Article when providing investment 
or ancillary services to their clients, including: 
(a) the conditions with which the information must comply in order to be fair, clear and not misleading; 
(b) the details about content and format of information to clients in relation to client categorisation, 
investment firms and their services, financial instruments, costs and charges; 
(c) the criteria for the assessment of a range of financial instruments available on the market; 
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(d) the criteria to assess compliance of firms receiving inducements with the obligation to act honestly, 
fairly and professionally in accordance with the best interest of the client. 
In formulating the requirements for information on financial instruments in relation to point b of 
paragraph 4 information on the structure of the product shall be included, where applicable, taking into 
account any relevant standardized information required under Union law. 
14.   The delegated acts referred to in paragraph 13 shall take into account: 
(a) the nature of the service(s) offered or provided to the client or potential client, taking into account 
the type, object, size and frequency of the transactions; 
(b) the nature and range of products being offered or considered including different types of financial 
instruments; 
(c) the retail or professional nature of the client or potential clients or, in the case of paragraphs 4 and 
5, their classification as eligible counterparties. 
 
I. General Features 
1. Purpose 
1 Articles 24 and 25 set out the core conduct-of-business rules with which an 
investment firm has to comply when providing services to its clients. These 
rules are supplemented by the MiFID II Delegated Regulation and the MiFID II 
Delegated Directive. Conduct-of-business rules are one of the mainstays of 
investor protection as outlined by the Foreword to Art 24 MiFID II. 
2. Level 2 and 3 Measures 
2 Level 2 measures include the following provisions of the MiFID II Delegated 
Regulation: Art 27 (remuneration policies and practices), Art 36 (investment 
research and marketing communications), Art 38 (additional general 
requirements in relation to underwriting or placing, Art 39 (additional 
requirements in relation to pricing of offerings in relation to issuance of financial 
instruments), Art 40 (additional requirements in relation to placing), Art 41 
(additional requirements in relation to advice, distribution and self-placement), 
Art 42 (additional requirements in relation to lending or provision of credit in the 
context of underwriting or placement), Art 43 (record keeping in relation to 
underwriting or placing), Art 44 (fair, clear and not misleading information 
requirements), Art 45 (information concerning client categorisation), Art 46 
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(general requirements for information to clients), Art 47 (information about the 
investment firm and its services for clients and potential clients), Art 48 
(information about financial instruments), Art 49 (information concerning 
safeguarding of client financial instruments or client funds), Art 50 (information 
on costs and associated charges), Art 51 (information provided in accordance 
with Directive 2009/65/EC and Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014)), Art 52 
(information about investment advice), Art 53 (investment advice on an 
independent basis), Art 58 (retail and professional client agreements), Art 64 
(best execution criteria), Art 65 (duty of investment firms carrying out portfolio 
management and reception and transmission of orders to act in the best 
interests of the client), Art 67 (client order handling: general principles), Art 68 
(aggregation and allocation of orders), and Art 69 (aggregation and allocation 
of transactions for own account). 
3 Level 2 measures include the following provisions in the MiFID II Delegated 
Directive: Art 9 (product governance obligations for investment firms 
manufacturing financial instruments), Art 10 (product governance obligations 
for distributors), Art 11 (inducements), Art 12 (inducements in respect of 
investment advice on an independent basis or portfolio management services), 
Art 13 (inducements in relation to research). 
4 Finally, the ESMA Guidelines on cross-selling practices, 11 July 2016, 
ESMA/2016/574 and the ESMA Guidelines on product governance, 2 June 
2017, ESMA35-43-620 contain additional guidance for implementing MiFID II. 
II. Best interest duty (Art 24(1)) 
5 Article 24(1) puts investment firms under an overarching obligation to act 
honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with the best interests of its 
clients. It provides national competent authorities with an overarching 
mechanism for reviewing investment firm behaviour, for capturing emerging 
risks and for proactively addressing the asymmetry in bargaining power which 
characterises the firm-client relationship.30 Article 24(1) is not exhaustively 
defined by Arts 24(2) through (12) and Art 25, and operates independently in 
                                            
30  Niamh Moloney, EU securities and financial markets regulation (3rd edn, Oxford University 
Press 2014) 800. 
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circumstances that are not addressed by Level 2 measures.31 For example, 
providing advice about a type of financial instrument (generic advice32) is not 
considered giving investment advice for the purposes of MiFID II. However, if 
generic advice is provided prior to or in the course of providing investment 
advice, it forms an integral part of the investment service.33 If an investment 
firm provides stand-alone generic advice to a client about a type of financial 
instrument which it presents as suitable for, or based on a consideration of the 
circumstances of, that client, and that advice is not in fact suitable for the client, 
or is not based on a consideration of his circumstances, the firm is likely to be 
acting in contravention of Art 24(1) or (3).34 
6 Investment firms are not considered to be executing orders when they transmit 
client orders to other entities for execution, or when they provide portfolio 
management services and place orders with other entities for execution.35 Yet, 
in order to comply with Art 24(1), investment firms providing these services 
must obtain the best possible result for their clients when transmitting or 
placing client orders, so that obligations similar to best-execution 
requirements under Art 27(1) apply.36 In effect, investment firms providing 
these services must take all sufficient steps to choose the entities most likely 
to deliver best execution and monitor the performance of the entity or entities 
in this respect. These investment firms must establish and implement a policy 
that enables them to obtain the best possible result for their clients.37 The 
content of these types of policies is further specified in Art 65(5) of the MiFID II 
Delegated Regulation, and the policy must be disclosed to clients under 
Art 65(6) of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation. The latter provision also 
stipulates further disclosure requirements with regard to the entity or entities 
chosen for execution, disclosures which closely resemble those required under 
                                            
31  Luca Enriques and Matteo Gargantini, ‘The overarching duty to act in the best interest of the 
client in MiFID II’ in Danny Busch and Guido Ferrarini (eds), Regulation of EU financial markets: 
MiFID II (Oxford University Press 2017) paras. 4.01-4.02. 
32  Recital 15 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
33  Recital 16 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
34  Recital 15 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
35  Art 65(8) MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
36  Art 65(3), (4) MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
37  Art 65(5) MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
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the best execution regime. Article 65(7) of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation 
requires an investment firm to monitor the effectiveness of its policy and sets 
out the requirements for reviewing the policy, which are procedures also 
required under the best execution regime. 
III. Product governance (Art 24(2)) 
7 Article 24(2) is part of the product-governance regime that MiFID II introduces. 
Article 24(2) applies to investment firms that create, develop, issue and/or 
design financial instruments for sale to clients (product manufacturers) and 
which offer or sell financial instruments to clients (distributors). The regulatory 
regime aims to avoid or reduce, from the early stages of a product’s life cycle, 
any potential risks of failure to comply with investor protection rules.38 The 
design, marketing and distribution of a financial instrument by an investment 
firm must be tailored to the target market of the financial instrument. A product 
manufacturer must design a financial instrument in such a way that it meets the 
needs of an identified target market of end clients within the relevant category 
of clients. The relevant category of clients refers to retail or professional clients. 
This requires a product manufacturer to identify the needs of the target market. 
Product manufacturers must further ensure that a distribution strategy is 
compatible with the target market, and that any distributor takes reasonable 
steps to ensure that a financial instrument is distributed to the identified target 
market (see paragraph 1 of Art 24(2)). Distributors must understand the 
financial instruments they offer or recommend, assess the compatibility of 
financial instruments with the needs of their clients considering a financial 
instrument’s target market, and ensure that they offer or recommend financial 
instruments only if it is in the interest of the client (see paragraph 2 of Art 24(2)). 
If a client falls within the target market, this does not automatically mean that 
the financial instrument is suitable for a client.39 
                                            
38  Recital 15 MiFID II Delegated Directive. 
39  Art 16(3) subpara 7 MiFID II. 
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1. MiFID II Delegated Directive 
8 Articles 9 and 10 of the MiFID II Delegated Directive provide a detailed list of 
obligations that product manufacturers and distributors need to comply with in 
order to meet their product-governance obligations. The provisions also specify 
the level of granularity needed to define a target market and the criteria used 
to do so. 
9 Product manufacturers and distributors must specify the ‘type(s) of client’ for 
whose needs, characteristics and objectives a financial instrument is 
compatible.40 As part of this process, manufacturers and distributors must 
identify any group(s) of clients for whose needs, characteristics and objectives 
a product is not compatible (negative target market).41 Type(s) of client means 
the group of clients that share common features important under the target 
market criteria. Personal features of individual clients are to be considered at 
the point of sale. ‘Type(s)’ of clients also indicates that a financial instrument 
can have multiple target markets, in particular when a differentiated distribution 
strategy is pursued. Distributors must appropriately identify and assess the 
circumstances and needs of clients they intend to sell to, so as to ensure that 
clients’ interests are not compromised as a result of commercial or other 
pressures.42 A product manufacturer that does not contact clients directly can 
(initially) determine the target market based on theoretical knowledge of, and 
past experience with, the financial instrument or similar financial instruments, 
the financial markets, and the needs, characteristics and objectives of potential 
end clients.43 A distributor which contacts clients directly, on the other hand, 
must use the information obtained from manufacturers and information about 
their actual clients to identify the target market.44 Only one target market 
assessment is required if a firm acts as both manufacturer and distributor.45  
                                            
40  Art 9(9) subpara 1, Art 10(1) subpara 3, (2) subpara 1 MiFID II Delegated Directive. 
41  Art 9(9) subpara 1, Art 10(2) subpara 2 MiFID II Delegated Directive. 
42  Art 10(2) subpara 1 MiFID II Delegated Directive. 
43  Art 9(9) subpara 2 MiFID II Delegated Directive. 
44  Art 10(2) subpara 4 MiFID II Delegated Directive. 
45  Art 10(2) subpara 4 MiFID II Delegated Directive. 
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10 If the manufacturer is not subject to the MiFID II product-governance regime, 
the relevant distributor which is subject to the MiFID II must independently 
define its target market, and must either obtain information from the 
manufacturer or use acceptable publicly available information, such as 
information disclosed in compliance with the Prospectus Directive, the UCITS 
Directive or the AIFM Directive.46 The MiFID II Delegated Directive provides 
some criteria of a target market assessment: the financial instrument’s (a) 
risk/reward profile must be consistent with the target market, (b) design must 
be driven by features that benefit the client, and (c) fee structure must be 
compatible with the needs of the target market, be appropriately transparent for 
the target market, and must not undermine the financial instrument’s return 
expectations.47 
2. ESMA’s guidelines on product governance 
1 ESMA’s guidelines on product-governance48 requirements mainly address 
target market assessments. In particular, the guidelines address (a) the criteria 
to be considered for identifying the target market, (b) the relationship between 
the distribution strategy and the definition of the target market, (c) methods to 
identify the negative target market, (d) application of the target market 
requirements in wholesale markets and (e) product distribution of products 
manufactured by firms not otherwise governed by MiFID II. ESMA also provides 
five very helpful case studies in the guidelines which illustrate how the 
requirements in the guidelines can be met. 
2 ESMA lists five categories that manufacturers and distributors must evaluate 
in order to define the target market for a financial product: the type of clients to 
whom the product is targeted; knowledge and experience; financial situation 
with a focus on the ability to bear losses; clients’ objectives and needs; and risk 
tolerance and compatibility of the risk/reward profile of the product with the 
target market. Since some of these categories are already used to conduct 
suitability or appropriateness tests (discussed further under Art 25 below), firms 
                                            
46  Art 10(1) subpara 2, (2) subpara 3 MiFID II Delegated Directive. 
47  Art 9(11), (12) MiFID II Delegated Directive. 
48  ESMA, Final report: Guidelines on MiFID II product governance requirements, 2 June 2017, 
ESMA35-43-620. 
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can use already existing information (in an abstract way) to identify the target 
market. The level of detail that is necessary with respect to any of the categories 
depends on the nature of the investment product and, in particular, its 
complexity and prevalence. For simple, common products, a target market 
can be identified in less detail than is needed for complicated or less common 
products.49 ESMA also acknowledges that it is possible to adopt a common 
approach (“bulk target market”) for financial instruments of one type with 
sufficiently comparable product features.50 Based on a distributor’s knowledge 
about its client base, distributors will often need to define a target market with 
more details than manufacturers, taking the relevant manufacturer’s target 
market as a starting point.51 Based on a distributor’s client information, the 
distributor may broaden or restrict the target market or distribution strategy 
recommended by a manufacturer. Regarding the distribution strategy, a 
manufacturer should propose the type of investment service (advised or non-
advised) through which the target market should usually acquire the financial 
instrument. If a product is deemed compatible for a sale without advice, the 
manufacturer must also specify the preferred acquisition channel (e.g. online). 
3 Distributors that do not engage in advised sales may not have any information 
regarding their clients’ financial situation, objectives, or knowledge and 
experience. It is to be welcomed that neither the MiFID II Delegated Directive 
nor ESMA’s guidelines introduce burdensome additional requirements for non-
advised sales at the point of sale through the back-door of the product 
governance regime. ESMA, in its guidelines, recognises that, depending on the 
type of investment service provided by a distributor, it may not be able to 
conduct a thorough target market assessment. Where a distributor only 
provides execution-only services, it is proportionate – and ESMA generally 
agrees with this view52 – that the distributor can rely on the target market 
                                            
49  ESMA, Final report: Guidelines on MiFID II product governance requirements, 2 June 2017, 
ESMA35-43-620, para 22. See also Recitals 18, 19 MiFID II Delegated Directive. 
50  ESMA, Final report: Guidelines on MiFID II product governance requirements, 2 June 2017, 
ESMA35-43-620, para 22. 
51  For details see ESMA, Final report: Guidelines on MiFID II product governance requirements, 
2 June 2017, ESMA35-43-620, paras 34-38, 42. 
52  ESMA, Final report: Guidelines on MiFID II product governance requirements, 2 June 2017, 
ESMA35-43-620, paras 40, 45-46. 
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assessment prepared by the manufacturer. That does not provide much clarity, 
however, because a provider of execution-only services will, due to a lack of 
client information, often not be able to assess whether a client falls within a 
manufacturer’s target market. ESMA’s guidelines indicate that the service can 
still be provided in such a case, but that a warning given to the client is 
necessary.53 
4 ESMA clarifies that distributing a product outside of its target market is not 
prohibited. In certain cases, which should be justified by the individual facts of 
a case, deviations between the abstract target market assessment and an 
individual sale of a product are permissible if all other rules of conduct that apply 
at the point of sale are met. The reason for the deviation must be clearly 
documented. ESMA gives an example of a case where a sale may occur to a 
client outside the target market: when an investment adviser recommends a 
product which would normally be too risky considering a client’s profile, but 
recommends the product for diversification purposes, and where the suitability 
requirements are fulfilled (see discussion under Art 25(2) below for additional 
information).54 ESMA also distinguishes between the positive target market, the 
negative target market and the area in between. A sale inside the negative 
target market shall be more difficult to justify than a sale that is merely outside 
the positive target market. A sale inside the negative target market must also 
be disclosed to the client.55 
IV. Information to clients (Arts 24(3) through (6)) 
1. Information and marketing communications 
5 Article 24(3) of MiFID II governs all communications between investment 
firms, potential clients and clients, and requires that all information must be ‘fair, 
clear and not misleading’. Article 24(3) applies to mandated and non-mandated 
disclosures. An exception to this obligation is provided by Recital 73 of the 
                                            
53  ESMA, Final report: Guidelines on MiFID II product governance requirements, 2 June 2017, 
ESMA35-43-620, paras 42, 47, Annex 3.3 para 34. 
54  ESMA, Final report: Guidelines on MiFID II product governance requirements, 2 June 2017, 
ESMA35-43-620, para 52. 
55  ESMA, Final report: Guidelines on MiFID II product governance requirements, 2 June 2017, 
ESMA35-43-620, para 55. 
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MiFID II Delegated Regulation, and applies when an investment firm provides 
to a client a copy of a prospectus that has been drawn up and published in 
accordance with Directive 2003/71/EC, if the firm is not responsible under 
Directive 2003/71/EC for the information given in the prospectus.. The 
exception exists because requirements under Art 24(3) should not overlap with 
requirements for preparing prospectuses under Directive 2003/71/EC.56 
Information must be connected to the provision of investment services or 
ancillary services in order to fall within the scope of Art 24(3), as evidenced by 
the reference to ‘clients’ in the provision. Information is considered to be 
misleading if it has a tendency to mislead the person or persons to whom it is 
addressed or by whom it is likely to be received, regardless of whether the 
person who provides the information considers or intends it to be misleading.57 
Article 24(3) clarifies that marketing communications are information for the 
purposes of MiFID II. Marketing Communications must be clearly identifiable 
as such (under the second sentence of Art 24(3)). MiFID II regulates marketing 
communications because retail investors often base their investment decision 
on marketing material, and because mandatory disclosure of information may 
be insufficient to counteract the initial influence of marketing communications 
on the decision-making process.58 Article 36 of the MiFID II Delegated 
Regulation distinguishes between investment research59 and 
recommendations of the type covered by point (35) of Art 3(1) of Regulation 
596/2014. Investment research is a sub-category of these recommendations.60 
If these recommendations do not meet the conditions set out in Art 36(1) of the 
                                            
56  CESR, Technical Advice on Level 2 Implementing Measures on the first set of mandates: MiFID 
feedback statement, January 2005, CESR/05-025, 31. 
57  Recital 68 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
58  CESR, Technical Advice on Level 2 Implementing Measures on the first set of mandates, 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, Feedback Statement, CESR/05-025, January 
2005, 31; Martin Brenncke, Regelung der Werbung im Bank- und Kapitalmarktrecht 
(Schulthess & Nomos 2013) 552, 870 
59  As defined in Art 36(1) of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation. Investment research is an ancillary 
service (Annex I, Section B(5) MiFID II) and not marketing material. 
60  Recital 50 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. For a detailed assessment of the complex 
demarcation between both categories under the terms of Art 24 MiFID I Implementing Directive 
see Martin Brenncke, ‘Die Abgrenzung von Finanzanalysen und anderen Empfehlungen zur 
Werbemitteilung: Zur Europarechtswidrigkeit des deutschen Rechts’ (2009) 21 Journal of 
Banking Law and Banking 361. 
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MiFID II Delegated Regulation, they are treated as marketing communications 
for the purposes of MiFID II and must be clearly identified as such.61 
6 Article 44 of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation amplifies Art 24(3), and sets out 
more detailed requirements regarding the content and presentation of 
information that investment firms address to, or disseminate in such a way 
that is likely to be received by, potential or actual retail or professional clients. 
Article 44 of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation is modelled on Art 27 of the 
MiFID I Implementing Directive and makes targeted improvements to the MiFID 
I regime. An important innovation of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation is that 
its scope of application is extended to professional clients. According to Recital 
65 of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation, Art 44 of the MiFID II Delegated 
Regulation does not apply to marketing communications which consist only of 
one or more of the following: the name of the firm, a logo or other image 
associated with the firm, a contact point, and a reference to the types of 
investment services provided by the firm. Yet, based on the wording and the 
purpose of Art 24(3) of MiFID II and Art 44 of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation, 
marketing communications of the type mentioned in Recital 65 of the MiFID II 
Delegated Regulation should be covered by the scope of those provisions.62 
Article 44 of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation provides detailed requirements 
for information provided to clients or potential clients to be considered fair, clear 
and not misleading.63 The detailed requirements are exhaustive64. In contrast 
to other provisions of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation, the wording of 
Art 44(1) does not include the words ‘in particular’ or ‘at least’. Additionally, the 
high level of detail used in Art 44 speaks in favour of interpreting the provision 
to be exhaustive. Article 44(1), when read in conjunction with its heading, 
implies that investment firms that provide information which satisfies the 
                                            
61  Art 36(2) of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
62  Martin Brenncke, Regelung der Werbung im Bank- und Kapitalmarktrecht (Schulthess & 
Nomos 2013) 846-851. 
63  Examples of bad practices in the context of information relating to contracts for difference that 
would not meet this standard are provided in ESMA, Q & A relating to the provision of CFDs 
and other speculative products to retail investors under MiFID, 31 March 2017, ESMA/35-36-
794, section 3, Question 1 para 2, Question 2 para 20. 
64  For a different view: Jonathan Herbst, A practitioner’s guide to MiFID II (2nd edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2015) 200. 
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conditions laid down in Arts 44(2) through (8) of the MiFID II Delegated 
Regulation are considered to have provided information that is fair, clear and 
not misleading and, thus, fulfil the requirements of Art 24(3). The conditions laid 
down in Arts 44(2) through (8) of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation must be 
interpreted consistently with the high-level principles in Art 24(3). 
7 Article 44 of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation stops short of requiring pre-
approval of marketing communications or of prescribing the content. 
Information provided in materials must be up-to-date, accurate and must 
always give a fair and prominent indication of any relevant risks when 
referencing any potential benefits of an investment service or financial 
instrument. The term ‘risks’ is interpreted broadly in accordance with Recital 67 
of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation and includes drawbacks and 
weaknesses.65 Article 44 also contains requirements as to the font size and the 
layout of information about risks. Information must be sufficient for, and 
presented in a way that is likely to be understood by, the average member of 
the group to whom it is directed, or by whom it is likely to be received. This 
obligation recognises that the standard of comprehensibility is adaptable to 
different subgroups of clients within the wider category of retail and professional 
clients. What this obligation does not clarify is what information must be 
sufficient for.66 Furthermore, information must not disguise, diminish or obscure 
important items, statements or warnings. Information must also be consistently 
presented in the same language, unless the client has agreed to receive 
information in more than one language. However, firms are not required to 
translate prospectuses provided to clients.67  
8 Further detailed requirements in Art 44 of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation 
apply to information containing (a) comparisons between instruments or 
services, (b) an indication of past performance of a financial instrument, a 
financial index or an investment service, (c) information on simulated past 
performance, (d) information on future performance, (e) a reference to a 
particular tax treatment, and (f) the name of any competent authority. 
                                            
65  Recital 67 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
66  For discussion in relation to marketing communications see Martin Brenncke, Regelung der 
Werbung im Bank- und Kapitalmarktrecht (Schulthess & Nomos 2013) 732-737. 
67  Recital 66 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
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Article 46(6) of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation specifies requirements for 
direct-offer marketing communications. Article 46(5) of the MiFID II Delegated 
Regulation requires investment firms to ensure that information contained in a 
marketing communications is consistent with other information the firm provides 
to clients. 
2. Mandated disclosure 
a) General requirements 
9 Article 24(4) contains MiFID II’s overarching disclosure requirement. It specifies 
what information investment firms must provide to potential clients and clients 
with regard to (a) the relevant investment firm and its services, (b) the financial 
instruments and proposed investment strategies, (c) execution venues and (d) 
all costs and related charges. MiFID II retains MiFID I’s existing disclosure 
requirements but also includes more detailed requirements and expands their 
scope. In particular, under Art 24(4)(b), information on financial instruments 
must now indicate whether an instrument is intended for retail or professional 
clients, taking into account the target market identified in accordance with the 
new product-governance requirements. Furthermore, paragraph 2 of 
Art 24(4)(c) of MiFID II introduces additional disclosure requirements 
regarding information about costs and charges of a financial instrument or 
financial service. All costs and charges which are not caused by the occurrence 
of ‘underlying market risk’ must be aggregated to allow a client to understand 
the overall cost as well as the cumulative effect on return of the investment. 
Underlying market risk in Art 24(4)(c) means movements in the value of capital 
invested caused directly by movements in the value of the underlying assets.68 
MiFID II considers disclosure of costs, together with disclosure of risks, as 
key elements which enhance the ability of investors to assess the products that 
are offered to them. The disclosure of costs and charges is underpinned by the 
principle that every difference between the price of a position for the firm and 
the respective price for the client should be disclosed, including mark-ups and 
mark-downs.69 
                                            
68  Recital 79 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
69  Recital 79 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
Martin Brenncke  28 
10 Under Arts 24(4) and (5), information must be appropriate, provided in good 
time and provided in a comprehensible form in order to ensure that clients and 
potential clients are reasonably able to understand the nature and risks of the 
relevant investment service and of the specific type of financial instrument that 
is being offered, and, consequently, can make investment decisions on an 
informed basis. MiFID II aims to empower investors to make educated 
investment decisions based on full disclosure. Member States may allow 
information to be provided in a standardised format under the second 
sentence of Art 24(5). According to ESMA, ‘standardised’ does not mean that 
a disclosure has to be individualised or generic, but refers to the formal 
appearance, content and layout.70 The requirement to provide information in 
good time has to be considered in light of a client’s relevant prior experience, 
familiarity with the product, the complexity of the product, and must take into 
account a client’s need for sufficient time to read and understand the 
information provided before making an investment decision (see Recital 83 of 
MiFID II).  
11 Recital 84 of MiFID II clarifies that as long as information is communicated to 
the client in good time, an investment firm is neither required to provide all 
required information to the client at the same time, nor required to incorporate 
the information into an agreement. The rules do not take into account the 
possibility of information overload negatively affecting the client’s 
understanding of the disclosed information. It follows that the issue of 
information overload is neglected with respect to interpreting the requirement 
that information be provided in a comprehensible form. If sufficient information 
in relation to the costs, associated charges, and risks of a financial instrument, 
is provided in accordance with other Union law (e.g. the UCITS KIID or PRIIPS 
KID), that information is appropriate for the purpose of Art 24(4); additionally, 
an investment firm must disclose to a client all other costs and charges relating 
to the investment service provided in accordance with Recital 78 of MiFID II. 
b) MiFID II Delegated Regulation 
                                            
70  ESMA, Consultation paper on MiFID II/MiFIR, 22 May 2014, ESMA/2014/549, 111-112. 
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12 The content and format of information required pursuant to Art 24(4) is 
supplemented by an extensive catalogue of disclosures set out in Arts 45 
through 51 of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation (which was based on Arts 28 
through 34 of the MiFID I Implementing Directive). Investment firms must inform 
a client about the firm’s categorisation of the client, of any right the client has 
to request a different categorisation, and about any limitations to the level of 
client protection that a different categorisation would entail (see Arts 45(1) and 
(2) of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation). Articles 46(1) and (2) of the MiFID II 
Delegated Regulation expands when, on an ex-ante basis, investment firms 
must inform a client or potential client about the terms of an agreement to 
provide investment or ancillary services, and must provide the information 
mandated under Arts 47 through 50 of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
Information can be provided via a durable medium71 or by means of publication 
on a website (where it does not constitute a durable medium).72 A client must 
be notified in good time of material changes to the information, provided it is 
relevant to a service that the firm is providing to that client.73 Article 47 of the 
MiFID II Delegated Regulation provides a detailed list of disclosures relating to 
the investment firm and its services, with specific requirements for portfolio 
managers.  
13 Information about financial instruments is mandated by Art 48 of the MiFID II 
Delegated Regulation, which requires that investment firms must provide 
potential clients and clients with a general description of the nature and risks of 
financial instruments, taking into account the characterisation of a client as 
either a retail client, professional client or eligible counterparty.74 The 
description must explain the nature of the specific type of instrument 
concerned, the functioning and performance of the financial instrument in 
different market conditions, including under both positive and negative 
conditions, as well as the risks particular to that specific type of instrument in 
                                            
71  See Art 4(1)(62) and Art 3(1) MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
72  Art 46(3) MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
73  Art 46(4) MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
74  See Recital 63 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
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sufficient detail.75 The level of detail necessary may vary according to whether 
a client is a retail client or a professional client, and the nature and risk profile 
of the financial instruments that are being offered, but should always include 
any essential elements.76 The elements necessary when describing the risks 
of a specific type of financial instrument are elaborated on in Art 48(2) of the 
MiFID II Delegated Regulation. Further informational requirements relating to 
specific financial instruments are imposed where a financial instrument is 
composed of two or more different financial instruments or services, 
incorporates a guarantee or capital protection, and with respect to retail clients 
where a prospectus is available for the financial instrument.77 Investment firms 
holding financial instruments or funds belonging to clients must meet the 
disclosure requirements enshrined in Art 49 of the MiFID II Delegated 
Regulation. 
c) Information about costs and charges 
14 Article 50 of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation sets out detailed requirements 
regarding what information investment firms must provide to clients about costs 
and charges pursuant to Art 24(4) of MiFID II, for example, (a) what kind of 
costs must be aggregated for ex-ante and ex-post disclosures about costs 
and charges, (b) that calculations of costs and charges for ex-ante disclosures 
should be based on actually incurred costs or, if these are not available, on a 
reasonable estimation,78 (c) that investment firms must provide clients with an 
illustration showing the cumulative effect of costs on return,79 and (d) that 
investment firms that recommend or market services provided by another firm 
must aggregate the costs and charges of its services together with the costs 
and charges of the services provided by the firm. Aggregated costs and 
charges shall be totalled and expressed both as a cash amount and as a 
                                            
75  Art 48(1) sentence 2 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
76  Recital 64 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
77  Art 48(4), (5), (3) MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
78  ESMA, Q & A on MiFID II and MiFIR investor protection and intermediaries topics, 10 July 2017, 
ESMA35-43-349, 9.14 provides details on when an estimation is reasonable. 
79  For requirements relating to the illustration see Art 50(10) MiFID II Delegated Regulation and 
ESMA, Q & A on MiFID II and MiFIR investor protection and intermediaries topics, 10 July 2017, 
ESMA35-43-349, 9.2 and 9.3. 
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percentage.80 In addition, investment firms are allowed to provide potential 
clients and clients with separate figures comprising aggregated initial costs and 
charges, aggregated on-going costs and charges and aggregated exit costs.81 
15 Ex-ante information about the costs related to the financial instrument may be 
provided based on an assumed investment amount, whereas ex-post 
disclosures should reflect a client’s actual investment amount at the time the 
disclosure is produced.82 Investment firms that recommend or market83 
financial instruments to clients or are required to provide a client with a UCITS 
KIID or PRIIPs KID must provide a full ex-ante disclosure of information about 
the aggregated costs and charges related to the financial instrument and to the 
investment or ancillary service provided.84 According to ESMA, an investment 
firm can fulfil its obligation under MiFID II with regard to ex-ante disclosure of 
costs and charges of a PRIIP by relying on the cost information presented in 
the PRIIPs KID, since the cost components mentioned in the PRIIPs KID cover 
all cost components.85 Investment firms referred to above must also provide 
annual post-sale information about all costs and charges related to both the 
financial instruments sold and the services provided, provided that a client and 
firm have had an ongoing client relationship during the given year.86 Such 
information must be based on costs incurred, must be provided on a 
personalised basis and can be provided together with any existing periodic 
reporting to clients.87 The annual post-sale information must be provided once 
a year, but may be provided more frequently, for example, each time a client 
                                            
80  Art 50(2) subpara 2 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. In detail: ESMA, Q & A on MiFID II and 
MiFIR investor protection and intermediaries topics, 10 July 2017, ESMA35-43-349, 9.13. 
81  Recital 80 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
82  Recital 78 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
83  For the meaning of “recommend or market” see ESMA, Consultation paper on MiFID II/MiFIR, 
22 May 2014, ESMA/2014/549, 102-103. 
84  Art 50(5) MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
85  ESMA, Q & A on MiFID II and MiFIR investor protection and intermediaries topics, 10 July 2017, 
ESMA35-43-349, 9.7. 
86  Art 50(9) subpara 1 sentence 1 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
87  Art 50(9) subpara 1 sentence 2, subpara 2 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. See ESMA, Q & A 
on MiFID II and MiFIR investor protection and intermediaries topics, 10 July 2017, ESMA35-
43-349, 9.1 for guidance on how to calculate the total costs incurred if the client buys and sells 
a fund during the business year. 
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receives a report about their investments.88 Investment firms not referred to 
above, for example, firms that passively execute orders, need only to inform 
their clients about all costs and charges relating to the service (and not the 
underlying financial instrument) which the firm provides.89 Article 51 of the 
MiFID II Delegated Regulation clarifies that investment firms distributing UCITS 
or PRIIPs must inform their clients about any other costs and associated 
charges related to the product which are not included in the relevant KIDs, and 
about any costs and charges of an investment service related to a financial 
instrument. 
16 Investment firms may agree with professional clients and eligible 
counterparties to limit the application of the requirements set forth in 
Arts 50(2)-(10) of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation, unless certain conditions 
are met.90 The MiFID II Delegated Regulation does not specify the extent to 
which the requirements may be limited, but it is clear that the parties cannot 
agree on standards below those set out in Art 24(4) of MiFID II.  
d) Disclosure requirements for certain investment services  
17 Special disclosure requirements arise (a) when an investment firm provides 
advice on corporate finance strategy and provides the service of underwriting 
or placing of financial instruments (Art 38(1) of the MiFID II Delegated 
Regulation),91 (b) in relation to pricing of offerings in relation to issuance of 
financial instruments (Art 39(2) of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation), (c) for 
investment firms placing financial instruments (Art 40 MiFID of the II Delegated 
Regulation), and (d) for investment firms engaged in offering financial 
instruments which the investment firm itself, or another entity in its group, would 
issue to their clients, when those instruments are included in the firm’s 
calculation of prudential requirements (Art 41(4) of the MiFID II Delegated 
Regulation). 
                                            
88  ESMA, Q & A on MiFID II and MiFIR investor protection and intermediaries topics, 10 July 2017, 
ESMA35-43-349, 9.4-9.5. 
89  Art 50(6) MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
90  Art 50(1) subparas 1, 2 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
91  For further guidance on the interpretation of Art 38(1) see ESMA, Q & A on MiFID II and MiFIR 
investor protection and intermediaries topics, 10 July 2017, ESMA35-43-349, 6.1-6.4. 
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3. Investment advice 
18 Article 24(4)(a) of MiFID II also contains specific requirements to disclose 
information when investment advice is provided. Disclosure requirements 
newly introduced by MiFID II for advisers require advisers to inform a potential 
client or client in good time, before providing investment advice, and in sufficient 
detail,92 (a) whether or not advice is provided on an independent basis, (b) 
whether the advice is based on a broad or on a more restricted analysis of 
different types of financial instruments, and in particular, whether the range of 
financial instruments is limited to those issued by entities closely linked to or 
tied to the firm, and (c) whether the investment firm will provide the client with 
a periodic assessment of the suitability of the financial instruments 
recommended to that client.  
19 Article 52 of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation specifies the particular 
disclosures required pursuant to Art 24(4)(a). Firms shall properly explain to 
potential clients and clients the scope and the features of any advice given. For 
example, investment firms shall provide a description of the types of financial 
instruments considered and the range of financial instruments and providers 
analysed per each type of instrument in accordance with the scope of the 
service. Sufficient details about the number of financial instruments analysed 
by the firm should be provided to its clients.93 Irrespective of the scope of the 
service offered, all assessments should be based on an adequate number of 
financial instruments which are available in the market to allow an appropriate 
consideration of alternatives.94 Investment firms must also describe the factors 
considered in the selection process when recommending financial 
instruments.95  
                                            
92  Recital 70 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
93  Recital 70 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
94  Ibid. 
95  Art 52(3) MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
Martin Brenncke  34 
V. Derogation from the scheme created by Art 24 (Art 24(6) 
20 Article 24(6) provides a derogation from the obligations set out in Art 24. 
Article 24(6) must be interpreted strictly to mean,96 first, that an investment 
service is offered as ‘part of a financial product’ only when it forms an integral 
part thereof at the time when the relevant financial product is offered to the 
client and, second, that the provisions of Union law referred to by Art 24(6) must 
include provisions setting out disclosure requirements that apply to the 
investment service which forms an integral part of the financial product in 
question. Under Art 24(6), the above conditions must both be met in order for 
an investment service to be exempted from the obligations laid down in 
Arts  24(3)-(5) of MiFID II.97 The second condition discussed above does not 
require that disclosures be identical to disclosures required under Arts 24(3)-
(5).98 Indications that an investment service does not form an integral part of 
the financial product in question include that the duration of the financial 
instrument to which that service relates is greater than that of the product, that 
a single financial instrument applies to different financial products offered to the 
same client or that the instrument and the product are offered in different 
contracts.99 Whereas Art 19(9) of MiFID I referred to EU law relating to credit 
institutions and consumer credits with respect to risk assessment of clients 
and/or information requirements, Art 24(6) has limited the scope of the 
derogation to information requirements. Thus, Art 24(6) does not exempt a 
suitability assessment (discussed further under Art 25 below) in accordance 
with MiFID II. 
VI. Independent investment advice (Art 24(7)) 
21 MiFID II reforms the structure of the investment advice industry by introducing 
the concept of providing investment advice on an independent basis. This 
reform of the investment advice market was introduced due to concerns over 
the quality of advice and mis-selling problems which were not prevented by 
                                            
96  Case C-604/11 Genil v Bankinter ECLI:EU:C:2013:344 paras 39, 48. 
97  Case C-604/11 Genil v Bankinter ECLI:EU:C:2013:344 paras 39, 48. 
98  Ibid, paras 45, 47. 
99  Ibid, para 44. 
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MiFID I.100 Whether or not the fee-based independent adviser model will 
become a success will depend on (a) whether it can overcome the considerable 
reluctance of retail investors to pay a fee for investment advice, and (b) the 
(alleged)101 unwillingness of advisers to advise those with limited assets. MiFID 
II’s reform of the advice industry has also been criticised for not sufficiently 
addressing conflicts of interest arising from advising about and selling 
proprietary products.102 
22 In order for investment advice to be considered independent, two conditions 
must be fulfilled according to Art 24(7). First, an independent adviser must 
assess a sufficient range of financial instruments available on the market 
which must be sufficiently diverse with regard to type of instrument, issuer or 
product provider, and may not be limited to proprietary or otherwise tied 
financial instruments (see Art 24(7)(a)). The standard requires less than 
assessing the full range of financial instruments available.103 The criteria further 
governing the assessment necessary under Art 24(7)(a) are provided by Art 53 
of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation. An independent investment adviser must 
not be bound by any form of agreement with a product provider that may limit 
the adviser’s ability, or the ability of a firm employing the adviser, to provide 
unbiased advice. Article 53(2) of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation also 
clarifies that independent investment advice can be provided by firms that focus 
on certain categories or a specified range of financial instruments, subject to 
restrictions provided in that article.  
23 Second, Art 24(7)(b) stipulates a prohibition on inducements (‘fees, 
commissions or any monetary or non-monetary benefits paid or provided by 
any third party’) being received by independent advisers. The prohibition is 
designed to reduce the risk of conflicts of interest. The prohibition creates the 
                                            
100  Commission, Impact Assessment accompanying the MiFID II/MiFIR proposals, 20 October 
2011, SEC(2011) 1226 final, 16. For concerns about the quality of advice under the MiFID I 
regime see Synovate, Consumer Market Study on Advice within the Area of Retail Investment 
Services—Final Report, 2011, 6-13. 
101  For the UK see Financial Conduct Authority, Financial Advice Market Review: Final Report, 
March 2016, 6. 
102  Niamh Moloney, EU securities and financial markets regulation (3rd edn, Oxford University 
Press 2014) 805. 
103  Recital 73 MiFID II. 
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condition that makes independent investment advice a fee-based service. If an 
independent adviser receives inducements, the value of the inducement must 
be transferred in full to the affected client or clients as soon as reasonably 
possible after receipt, and any affected client must be informed about it, for 
example through the periodic reporting statements provided to a client.104 A 
corresponding policy should be set up as part of a firm’s organisational 
requirements.105 Recital 74 of MiFID II also clarifies that a firm is not allowed to 
offset any third-party payments from the fees due from a client to the firm. 
24 A de minimis exception applies to minor non-monetary benefits (see the 
second sentence of Art 24(7)(b)). Minor non-monetary benefits are excluded 
from the prohibition if they are (a) capable of enhancing the quality of service 
provided to a client (enhancement requirement), (b) of a scale and nature such 
that they could not be judged to impair compliance with the firm’s duty to act in 
the best interest of the client and (c) clearly disclosed to the client. Article 12(3) 
of the MiFID II Delegated Directive lists the minor non-monetary benefits that 
are deemed acceptable under MiFID II.106 Despite that the list appears to limit 
the definition of minor non-monetary benefits, it allows Member States to 
recognise other minor non-monetary benefits as acceptable provided that 
certain circumstances are met.107 Without prejudice to this possibility, benefits 
which meet the ‘enhancement requirement’ in Art 24(7)(b) are exhaustively 
listed in Art 12(3) of the MiFID II Delegated Directive. Acceptable minor non-
monetary benefits must, furthermore, be reasonable and proportionate and of 
such a scale that they are unlikely to influence the investment firm’s behaviour 
in any way that is detrimental to the interests of the relevant client.108 Any non-
monetary benefit that involves a third party allocating valuable resources to an 
investment firm cannot be considered as minor.109 Acceptable minor non-
monetary benefits must be disclosed to the relevant client or clients prior to 
providing advice; any minor non-monetary benefits may be described in a 
                                            
104  Art 12(1) subparas 1 and 3 MiFID II Delegated Directive; Recital 74 MiFID II. 
105  Art 12(1) subpara 2 MiFID II Delegated Directive; Recital 74 MiFID II. 
106  Art 12(2) MiFID II Delegated Directive. 
107  Art 12(3)(e) MiFID II Delegated Directive. 
108  Art 12(3) subpara 2 MiFID II Delegated Directive. 
109  Recital 30 MiFID II Delegated Directive. 
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generic way (summary description of the benefit without any assessment of 
their value).110 
25 Article 53(1) of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation provides that independent 
investment advisers must create and implement a selection process to assess 
and compare a range of sufficiently diverse financial instruments, which must 
contain the elements provided for in Arts 53(3)(a)-(d) of the MiFID II Delegated 
Regulation. These elements do not require advisers to consider a specific, or 
even a minimum, number or variety of financial instruments. Rather, the 
number and variety of financial instruments which must be assessed and 
compared must be proportionate to the scope of the advisory services offered, 
adequately representative of financial instruments available on the market, 
proportionate to the quantity of financial instruments issued by the investment 
firm itself or by entities closely linked to the investment firm, and proportionate 
to the characteristics of the investment firm’s clients. For firms providing both 
independent and non-independent advice, Art 53(3) of the MiFID II Delegated 
Regulation imposes additional restrictions, namely (a) disclosing the correct 
advisory service to clients, (b) restrictions on presenting the firm as 
independent and (c) having organisational controls to ensure that independent 
and non-independent advice and advisers are clearly separate (including that 
the same adviser does not provide both types of advice). 
26 The requirements for independent investment advice and advisers do not rule 
out the possibility that unbiased and unrestricted analysis of financial 
instruments could result in a firm recommending financial instruments which 
are issued or provided by the firm itself or by entities having close links. If 
independent advice offered by a firm routinely or frequently results in 
recommendations of proprietary or otherwise tied financial instruments, ESMA 
expects that firm to thoroughly assess whether the recommendations are the 
result of any conflict of interest.111 
                                            
110  Art 12(3) subpara 3 MiFID II Delegated Directive. 
111  ESMA, Q & A on MiFID II and MiFIR investor protection and intermediaries topics, 10 July 2017, 
ESMA35-43-349, 5.1. 
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VII. Inducements (Arts 24(8)-(9)) 
27 Commission-based distribution has been associated with a range of failures, 
including giving poor quality advice and mis-selling. The strengthened regime 
for inducements under MiFID II is designed to enhance the quality of advice 
and to reduce the vulnerability of clients arising from risks of conflicts of interest. 
Despite discussing proposals to prohibit all third-party payments or benefits 
across all distribution channels, the Member States, reflecting local industry 
structures, could not agree on a prohibition more stringent than that suggested 
by the Commission in its 2010 MiFID I review for independent investment 
advice and for portfolio management.112 Member States are, however, free to 
impose a general ban on inducements for all distribution channels if the 
requirements of Art 24(12) are fulfilled. As a general requirement, all investment 
firms (including independent investment advisers) must have in place policies 
and systems to assess the nature of any service, benefit or material provided 
by or to any third party to determine whether the investment firm may accept it 
or provide it, as the case may be, under the applicable inducement rules.113 
1. Portfolio management services 
28 Article 24(8) prohibits portfolio managers from receiving inducements, which 
mirrors Art 27(b) with regard to independent investment advisers (see above 
paragraphs 23-24 for discussion). 
2. All other investment services 
29 For all other investment firms other than portfolio managers and independent 
investment advisers, Art 24(9) states the general rule that an investment firm 
does not act in the best interest of its clients when it receives or provides 
inducements in connection with providing an investment service or an ancillary 
service. An exception applies, and the relevant inducement does not have to 
be passed on to clients, if the inducement is (a) designed to enhance the quality 
of a client service, (b) consistent with the firm’s duty to act in a client’s best 
                                            
112  Cyprus Presidency Progress Report on MiFID II/MiFIR, 13 December 2012, Council Document 
16523/128, 8. 
113  ESMA, Q & A on MiFID II and MiFIR investor protection and intermediaries topics, 10 July 2017, 
ESMA35-43-349, 7.3. 
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interest, and (c) clearly disclosed to the affected client (see Art 24(9)). Particular 
requirements regarding inducements also apply to specific investment services 
offered: (a) when an investment firm places financial instruments under 
Art 40(3) of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation, and (b) when an investment firm 
provides services to a client to participate in a new issue under Art 41(1) of the 
MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
30 Article 11(2) of the MiFID II Delegated Directive clarifies that a fee, commission 
or non-monetary benefit is designed to enhance the quality of the relevant 
service to the client if the conditions specified in Art 11(2)(a)-(c) of the MiFID II 
Delegated Directive are satisfied. The conditions for a fee, commission or non-
monetary benefit to be considered quality enhancing will be construed 
strictly.114 Investment firms must be able to show evidence that the conditions 
have been met, and must meet the conditions on an ongoing basis so long as 
an investment firm continues to pay or receive the relevant inducements.115 For 
example, an inducement must be justified by the provision of an additional or 
higher level service to the affected client, proportional to the level of 
inducements received, and Art 11(2)(a) provides a non-exhaustive list of 
examples when this would be the case. Non-independent investment advisers 
may fulfil this condition, for example, if they provide clients with access to a 
wide range of suitable financial instruments including an appropriate number of 
instruments offered by third parties having no close links with the investment 
firm. Even though the wording of Art 11(2)(c) of the MiFID II Delegated Directive 
appears to rule out one-off inducements, as opposed to on-going 
inducements, this seems to be a ‘drafting’ error in the uptake of ESMA’s 
technical advice.116 One-off inducements should thus be capable of meeting 
the quality enhancement criterion if they fulfil the other two conditions set out in 
the Art 11(2)(b) and (c) of the MiFID Delegated Directive. 
31 Paragraph 2 of Art 24(9) requires investment firms to, where applicable, inform 
clients of how an inducement can be transferred to him or her. Firms need to 
                                            
114  Commission, Request to ESMA for technical advice on possible delegated acts concerning 
MiFID II, 23 April 2014, 26. 
115  Art 11(3), (4) MiFID II Delegated Directive. 
116  ESMA, Final report: ESMA’s technical advice to the Commission on MiFID II and MiFIR, 19 
December 2014, ESMA/2014/1569, 142. 
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clearly disclose to a client, in a manner that is comprehensive, accurate and 
understandable, prior to the provision of an investment service, the existence, 
nature and amount of any relevant inducement, or, where the amount cannot 
be ascertained, the method of calculating that amount. This disclosure 
requirement is supplemented by Art 11(5) of the MiFID II Delegated Directive, 
which addresses key issues raised by the Commission in its review of MiFID I’s 
regime governing inducements117 relating to difficulties in distinguishing 
between summary and detailed disclosures, the absence of ex-post disclosures 
and the absence of any details regarding the content of the disclosure. 
32 Paragraph 3 of Art 24(9) of MiFID II includes a non-exhaustive list of payments 
and benefits which are excepted from the general prohibition against 
inducements, such as custody costs, settlement and exchange fees, regulatory 
levies or legal fees. These payments or benefits must enable or be necessary 
for the provision of investment services and they must not, by their nature, give 
rise to conflicts with the investment firm’s general obligation of fair treatment. 
3. Research conducted by third parties 
33 Investment firms, including financial advisers and portfolio managers, use 
research when making decisions regarding investment advice or portfolio 
management. Receiving research conducted by third parties is generally 
considered an inducement under MiFID II.118 A broad definition of research is 
provided by Recital 28 of MiFID II Delegated Directive, according to which two 
conditions need to be met: (1) A material or service must concern one or several 
financial instruments or other assets, or current or potential issuers of financial 
instruments, or be closely related to a specific industry or market such that it 
informs views on financial instruments, assets or issuers within that industry or 
market. (2) This material or service  explicitly or implicitly recommends or 
suggests an investment strategy and provides a substantiated opinion as to the 
present or future value or price of such instruments or assets, or otherwise 
contains analysis and original insights and reaches conclusions based on new 
or existing information that could be used to inform an investment strategy and 
                                            
117  Commission, Public consultation: review of MiFID, 8 December 2010, 60. 
118  Art 13 MiFID II Delegated Directive is drafted as an exception. 
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is relevant and capable of adding value to an investment firm’s decisions which 
it makes on behalf of clients being charged for that research.119 Any 
assessment of whether material is substantive or not is dependent on its 
content and not any label given by the provider.120 The following material is not 
considered research provided by third parties for the purposes of Art 13 MiFID 
II Delegated Directive: Non-substantive material or services consisting of 
short term market commentary on the latest economic statistics or company 
results or information on upcoming releases or events, which is provided by a 
third party and contains only a brief summary of its own opinion on such 
information that is not substantiated nor includes any substantive analysis, for 
example, material that reiterates a view based on an existing recommendation 
or substantive research material or services. Material described above, if 
provided to an investment firm by a third party, could be deemed to be 
information relating to a financial instrument or an investment service that is 
generic in nature pursuant to Art 12(3)(a) of the MiFID II Delegated Directive 
and would constitute an acceptable minor non-monetary benefit.121 The same 
applies to material repeating or summarising public news stories or public 
statements from corporate issuers.122 Macro-economic analysis may be 
classified as research it if falls under the definition of research set out in Recital 
28 of MiFID II Delegated Directive. If macro-economic analysis is not 
considered research in an individual case, it does not automatically classify as 
a minor non-monetary benefit.123 
34 The dominant market practice prior to the enactment of MiFID II was for brokers 
to bundle payments for research into transaction costs, a practice that is not 
permissible under MiFID II. Research is not regarded as an inducement, and 
therefore is permissible, if it is received in return for (a) direct payments by the 
                                            
119  This broad definition of research includes investment research as defined in Art 36(1) MiFID II 
Delegated Regulation. 
120  ESMA, Q & A on MiFID II and MiFIR investor protection and intermediaries topics, 10 July 2017, 
ESMA35-43-349, 7.6. 
121  Recital 29 MiFID II Delegated Directive. 
122  ESMA, Q & A on MiFID II and MiFIR investor protection and intermediaries topics, 10 July 2017, 
ESMA35-43-349, 7.6. 
123  ESMA, Q & A on MiFID II and MiFIR investor protection and intermediaries topics, 10 July 2017, 
ESMA35-43-349, 7.8. 
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investment firm from its own resources or (b) payments from a separately 
created research payment account which the investment firm controls (see 
Art 13(1) of the MiFID II Delegated Directive for more information). An 
investment firm may reflect research costs made by direct payments out of its 
own resources by increasing its portfolio management or advisory fees.124 
Among the obligations for operating a research payment account are 
obligations to fund it through a specific research charge to the client, to set and 
regularly assess a research budget and to regularly assess the quality of the 
research purchased provided. According to ESMA, a research budget can be 
set for a group of client portfolios or accounts which share sufficiently similar 
investment objectives and research needs.125 Even where a research budget 
is used to serve several portfolios, a firm is still required to provide individual 
clients with a specific research charge amount. The specific research charge 
must not be linked to the volume and/or value of transactions executed on 
behalf of clients.126  
35 Consistent with Art 24(4)(c) of MiFID II, a range of ex-ante and ex-post 
disclosures about research payment accounts must be made to clients,127 and 
the total amount of any research fee charged to clients must not exceed the 
research budget.128 Article 13(9) of the MiFID II Delegated Directive also 
specifies that any payment for third-party research should not be linked to 
payments made for executing orders. If a firm provides execution services and 
also provides unsolicited (or ‘free’) research, the firm would not meet its 
obligation under Art 13(9) of the MiFID II Delegated Directive to price services 
separately.129 
                                            
124  ESMA, Final report: technical advice to the Commission on MiFID II and MiFIR, 19 December 
2014, ESMA/2014/1569, 138. 
125  ESMA, Q & A on MiFID II and MiFIR investor protection and intermediaries topics, 10 July 2017, 
ESMA35-43-349, 7.1. 
126  Art 13(2)(b) MiFID II Delegated Directive. 
127  Art 13(1)(c), (2), (8) MiFID II Delegated Directive. See also ESMA, Q & A on MiFID II and MiFIR 
investor protection and intermediaries topics, 10 July 2017, ESMA35-43-349, 7.10-7.11. 
128  Art 13(4) MiFID II Delegated Directive. 
129  ESMA, Q & A on MiFID II and MiFIR investor protection and intermediaries topics, 10 July 2017, 
ESMA35-43-349, 7.3. 
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36 The MiFID II Delegated Directive does not expressly state whether or not its 
Art 13 is exhaustive with respect to what could constitute inducements in 
relation to research. Written material received by an investment firm from a third 
party that is commissioned and paid for by a corporate issuer, or potential 
issuer, to promote a new issuance by that company, may be considered 
acceptable minor non-monetary benefits pursuant to Art 12(3)(b) of the MiFID 
II Delegated Directive, provided that the provision’s further conditions are 
fulfilled. Such material is not considered ‘research’ for the purposes of Art 13 of 
the MiFID II Delegated Directive.130 
37 At first it appears unclear whether material that fulfils the definition of research 
conducted by third parties could ever constitute an acceptable minor non-
monetary benefit by fulfilling the conditions of Art 12(3)(a) MiFID II Delegated 
Directive when provided to an independent investment advisor or a portfolio 
manager. It also appears unclear whether research provided by a third party to 
an investment firm can ever fulfil the quality enhancement criterion under 
Arts 24(9)(a) of MiFID II, 11(2) of the MiFID II Delegated Directive. The recitals 
in the MiFID II Delegated Directive suggest that the answer to the first ambiguity 
is no.131 ESMA agrees that independent investment advisers and portfolio 
managers may only receive research by complying with Art 13 of the MiFID II 
Delegated Directive. It follows that independent investment advisors and 
portfolio managers may not accept research for free.132 In relation to all other 
investment firms, ESMA’s position is that a firm receiving research can assess 
whether the receipt of the research meets the quality enhancement criterion. If 
it does, the firm can receive the research for free. If the firm pays for the 
research, it must comply with Art 13 of the MiFID II Delegated Directive.133 
                                            
130  Recital 29 MiFID II Delegated Directive (“other types of information or material received from 
third parties”). 
131  Ibid. 
132  ESMA, Q & A on MiFID II and MiFIR investor protection and intermediaries topics, 10 July 2017, 
ESMA35-43-349, 7.3 (also with regard to how to deal with unsolicited research), 7.6. 
133  For further details see ibid; cf Recital 54 MiFID II Delegated Regulation (“only”). 
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VIII. Staff remuneration (Art 24(10)) 
1 Conflict of interest risk resulting from remuneration arrangements threatens 
good outcomes for investors and contributes considerably to mis-selling and 
poor-quality investment advice.134 Remuneration structures have significant 
potential to misalign incentives in the distribution process, which is why an 
investment firm must ensure that it does not remunerate or assess the 
performance of its staff in a way that conflicts with its duty to act in the best 
interest of its clients (see the first sentence of Art 24(10)). In particular, 
remuneration structures and sales targets should not incentivise staff to 
recommend inappropriate financial instruments to retail clients (see the second 
sentence of Art 24(10)). The rules of conduct in Art 24(10) are supplemented 
by MiFID II’s firm-governance regime, which requires that a management body 
define, approve and oversee any remuneration policy of persons involved in 
the provision of services to clients under Art 9(3)(c). Remuneration refers to 
all forms of payments or financial or non-financial benefits provided directly or 
indirectly by firms to relevant persons that provide investment or ancillary 
services to clients (remuneration is defined by Art 2(5) of the MiFID II Delegated 
Regulation). This broad definition includes cash, shares, options, cancellations 
of loans to relevant persons at dismissal, pension contributions, wage 
increases, promotions, health insurance, discounts or special benefits such as 
generous expense accounts or seminars in exotic destinations, and 
remuneration by third parties through, for example, carried interest models.135 
2 Article 27 of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation specifies how remuneration 
policies and practices need to be designed and implemented by an 
investment firm, and it broadly defines the relevant persons governed by the 
provision. The relevant persons include front-office staff, sales force staff, tied 
agents, persons involved in complaints-handling, persons involved in product 
design and development, persons overseeing sales forces (such as line 
managers) who may be incentivised to pressure sales staff, financial analysts 
whose literature may be used by sales staff to entice clients to make investment 
                                            
134  Niamh Moloney, EU securities and financial markets regulation (3rd edn, Oxford University 
Press 2014) 793-794. 
135  Recital 40 of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
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decisions and other staff indirectly involved in the provision of investment 
services.136 In particular, a balance between fixed and variable components of 
remuneration shall be maintained at all times. Remuneration and similar 
incentives shall not be solely or predominantly based on quantitative 
commercial criteria (like sales volumes or value of instruments sold) but shall 
take into account qualitative criteria reflecting compliance with the applicable 
regulations, fair treatment of clients and the quality of client service.137 
Article 27 of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation is informed by ESMA’s 
guidelines relating to remuneration policies and practices under MiFID I; 
ESMA’s guidelines may also be taken into account when determining what is 
considered good practice under the MiFID II standard.138 
IX. Cross-selling practices (Art 24(11)) 
3 The practice of bundling or tying together investment services or other services 
or products can distort competition and negatively affect client mobility and the 
ability of clients to make informed choices (as stated in Recital 81 of MiFID II). 
In order to prevent these risks, Art 24(11) contains certain disclosure 
requirements that an investment firm must fulfil when offering bundled or tied 
packages.139 The wording of Art 24(11), ‘whether it is possible’, indicates that it 
may not be possible to buy at least one of the different components separately 
and, thus, does not rule out all tying practices (cf. Recital 81 of MiFID II). ESMA 
has developed guidelines on cross-selling practices.140 
X. Gold-plating (Art 24(12)) 
4 Member States may impose additional requirements on investment firms in 
respect of the matters covered by Art 24 if they meet the strict requirements of 
Art 24(12). Any additional requirements must not restrict or otherwise affect the 
passporting rights of investment firms under Arts 34 and 35 of MiFID II. The 
                                            
136  Recital 41 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
137  Art 27(4) of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
138  ESMA, Guidelines: remuneration policies and practices (MiFID), 1 October 2013, 
ESMA/2013/606; ESMA, Final report: technical advice to the Commission on MiFID II and 
MiFIR, 19 December 2014, ESMA/2014/1569, pp 97-98. 
139  Art 4(1)(42) contains the definition for “cross-selling practice”. 
140  ESMA, Guidelines on cross-selling practices, 11 July 2016, ESMA/2016/574. 
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MiFID I Implementing Directive contained a similar provision in its Art 4. Under 
MiFID I, it was controversial whether Member States could depart from not only 
the implementing measures under the Directive, but also the conduct rules 
contained in MiFID I. The shift of the provision from an implementing to the 
framework measure under MiFID II has solved this controversy. Yet, the 
changes have created a new controversy since the wording of Art 24(12) allows 
Member States to impose additional requirements in respect of the matters 
‘covered by this Article’. It is unclear whether that means that Member States 
cannot adopt additional requirements in respect of those set out in other Articles 
relating to operating conditions in Chapter II that do not contain a gold-plating 
provision. The effect of such a narrow interpretation would render the scope of 
Art 24(12) significantly narrower than that of its predecessor in Art 4 of the 
MiFID I Implementing Directive, and would undermine the shift of the provision 
to the framework directive. Furthermore, specific rules for conducting business 
within the body of MiFID II specify the duty to act in accordance with a client’s 
best interest, as enshrined in Art 24(1). Thus, Art 24(12) regulates gold-plating 
with regard to all conduct-of-business rules (contained in Arts 24 through 
28).141 
 
Article 25 – Assessment of suitability and appropriateness and reporting 
to clients 
1.   Member States shall require investment firms to ensure and demonstrate to competent authorities 
on request that natural persons giving investment advice or information about financial instruments, 
investment services or ancillary services to clients on behalf of the investment firm possess the 
necessary knowledge and competence to fulfil their obligations under Article 24 and this Article. 
Member States shall publish the criteria to be used for assessing such knowledge and competence. 
2.   When providing investment advice or portfolio management the investment firm shall obtain the 
necessary information regarding the client’s or potential client’s knowledge and experience in the 
investment field relevant to the specific type of product or service, that person’s financial situation 
including his ability to bear losses, and his investment objectives including his risk tolerance so as to 
enable the investment firm to recommend to the client or potential client the investment services and 
financial instruments that are suitable for him and, in particular, are in accordance with his risk tolerance 
and ability to bear losses. 
                                            
141  Niamh Moloney, EU securities and financial markets regulation (3rd edn, Oxford University 
Press 2014) 340. 
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Member States shall ensure that where an investment firm provides investment advice recommending 
a package of services or products bundled pursuant to Article 24(11), the overall bundled package is 
suitable. 
3.   Member States shall ensure that investment firms, when providing investment services other than 
those referred to in paragraph 2, ask the client or potential client to provide information regarding that 
person’s knowledge and experience in the investment field relevant to the specific type of product or 
service offered or demanded so as to enable the investment firm to assess whether the investment 
service or product envisaged is appropriate for the client. Where a bundle of services or products is 
envisaged pursuant to Article 24(11), the assessment shall consider whether the overall bundled 
package is appropriate. 
Where the investment firm considers, on the basis of the information received under the first 
subparagraph, that the product or service is not appropriate to the client or potential client, the 
investment firm shall warn the client or potential client. That warning may be provided in a standardised 
format. 
Where clients or potential clients do not provide the information referred to under the first subparagraph, 
or where they provide insufficient information regarding their knowledge and experience, the investment 
firm shall warn them that the investment firm is not in a position to determine whether the service or 
product envisaged is appropriate for them. That warning may be provided in a standardised format. 
4.   Member States shall allow investment firms when providing investment services that only consist 
of execution or reception and transmission of client orders with or without ancillary services, excluding 
the granting of credits or loans as specified in Section B.1 of Annex I that do not comprise of existing 
credit limits of loans, current accounts and overdraft facilities of clients, to provide those investment 
services to their clients without the need to obtain the information or make the determination provided 
for in paragraph 3 where all the following conditions are met: 
(a) the services relate to any of the following financial instruments: 
(i) shares admitted to trading on a regulated market or on an equivalent third-country market or 
on a MTF, where those are shares in companies, and excluding shares in non-UCITS 
collective investment undertakings and shares that embed a derivative; 
(ii) bonds or other forms of securitised debt admitted to trading on a regulated market or on an 
equivalent third country market or on a MTF, excluding those that embed a derivative or 
incorporate a structure which makes it difficult for the client to understand the risk involved; 
(iii) money-market instruments, excluding those that embed a derivative or incorporate a 
structure which makes it difficult for the client to understand the risk involved; 
(iv) shares or units in UCITS, excluding structured UCITS as referred to in the second 
subparagraph of Article 36(1) of Regulation (EU) No 583/2010; 
(v) structured deposits, excluding those that incorporate a structure which makes it difficult for 
the client to understand the risk of return or the cost of exiting the product before term; 
(vi) other non-complex financial instruments for the purpose of this paragraph. 
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For the purpose of this point, a third-country market shall be considered to be equivalent to a 
regulated market if the requirements and the procedure laid down under the third and the fourth 
subparagraphs are fulfilled. 
At the request of the competent authority of a Member State, the Commission shall adopt 
equivalence decisions in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 89a(2), 
stating whether the legal and supervisory framework of a third country ensures that a regulated 
market authorised in that third country complies with legally binding requirements which are, for 
the purpose of the application of this point, equivalent to the requirements resulting from 
Regulation (EU) No 596/2014, from Title III of this Directive, from Title II of Regulation (EU) No 
600/2014 and from Directive 2004/109/EC, and which are subject to effective supervision and 
enforcement in that third country. The competent authority shall indicate why it considers that the 
legal and supervisory framework of the third country concerned is to be considered equivalent 
and shall provide relevant information to that end. 
Such third-country legal and supervisory framework may be considered equivalent where that 
framework fulfils at least the following conditions: 
(i) the markets are subject to authorisation and to effective supervision and enforcement on an 
ongoing basis; 
(ii) the markets have clear and transparent rules regarding the admission of securities to trading 
so that such securities are capable of being traded in a fair, orderly and efficient manner, 
and are freely negotiable; 
(iii) security issuers are subject to periodic and ongoing information requirements ensuring a 
high level of investor protection; and 
(iv) market transparency and integrity are ensured by the prevention of market abuse in the 
form of insider dealing and market manipulation. 
 
(b) the service is provided at the initiative of the client or potential client; 
(c) the client or potential client has been clearly informed that in the provision of that service the 
investment firm is not required to assess the appropriateness of the financial instrument or service 
provided or offered and that therefore he does not benefit from the corresponding protection of 
the relevant conduct of business rules. Such a warning may be provided in a standardised format; 
(d) the investment firm complies with its obligations under Article 23. 
5.   The investment firm shall establish a record that includes the document or documents agreed 
between the investment firm and the client that set out the rights and obligations of the parties, and the 
other terms on which the investment firm will provide services to the client. The rights and duties of the 
parties to the contract may be incorporated by reference to other documents or legal texts. 
6.   The investment firm shall provide the client with adequate reports on the service provided in a 
durable medium. Those reports shall include periodic communications to clients, taking into account 
the type and the complexity of financial instruments involved and the nature of the service provided to 
the client and shall include, where applicable, the costs associated with the transactions and services 
undertaken on behalf of the client. 
Martin Brenncke  49 
When providing investment advice, the investment firm shall, before the transaction is made, provide 
the client with a statement on suitability in a durable medium specifying the advice given and how that 
advice meets the preferences, objectives and other characteristics of the retail client. 
Where the agreement to buy or sell a financial instrument is concluded using a means of distance 
communication which prevents the prior delivery of the suitability statement, the investment firm may 
provide the written statement on suitability in a durable medium immediately after the client is bound 
by any agreement, provided both the following conditions are met: 
(a) the client has consented to receiving the suitability statement without undue delay after the 
conclusion of the transaction; and 
(b) the investment firm has given the client the option of delaying the transaction in order to receive 
the statement on suitability in advance. 
Where an investment firm provides portfolio management or has informed the client that it will carry out 
a periodic assessment of suitability, the periodic report shall contain an updated statement of how the 
investment meets the client’s preferences, objectives and other characteristics of the retail client. 
7.   If a credit agreement relating to residential immovable property, which is subject to the provisions 
concerning creditworthiness assessment of consumers laid down in Directive 2014/17/EU of the 
European Parliament and the Council (48), has as a prerequisite the provision to that same consumer 
of an investment service in relation to mortgage bonds specifically issued to secure the financing of and 
having identical terms as the credit agreement relating to residential immovable property, in order for 
the loan to be payable, refinanced or redeemed, that service shall not be subject to the obligations set 
out in this Article. 
8.   The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 89 to 
ensure that investment firms comply with the principles set out in paragraphs 2 to 6 of this Article when 
providing investment or ancillary services to their clients, including information to obtain when assessing 
the suitability or appropriateness of the services and financial instruments for their clients, criteria to 
assess non-complex financial instruments for the purposes of point (a)(vi) of paragraph 4 of this Article, 
the content and the format of records and agreements for the provision of services to clients and of 
periodic reports to clients on the services provided. Those delegated acts shall take into account: 
(a) the nature of the service(s) offered or provided to the client or potential client, having regard to 
the type, object, size and frequency of the transactions; 
(b) the nature of the products being offered or considered, including different types of financial 
instruments; 
(c) the retail or professional nature of the client or potential clients or, in the case of paragraph 6, their 
classification as eligible counterparties. 
9.   ESMA shall adopt by 3 January 2016 guidelines specifying criteria for the assessment of knowledge 
and competence required under paragraph 1. 
10.   ESMA shall develop by 3 January 2016, and update periodically, guidelines for the assessment 
of: 
(a) financial instruments incorporating a structure which makes it difficult for the client to understand 
the risk involved in accordance with points (a)(ii) and (a)(iii) of paragraph 4; 
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(b) structured deposits incorporating a structure which makes it difficult for the client to understand 
the risk of return or the cost of exiting the product before term, in accordance with point (a)(v) of 
paragraph 4. 
11.   ESMA may develop guidelines, and update them periodically, for the assessment of financial 
instruments being classified as non-complex for the purpose of point (a)(vi) of paragraph 4, taking into 
account the delegated acts adopted under paragraph 8. 
 
I. General Features 
1. Purpose 
1 Articles 24 and 25 set out the core conduct-of -business rules with which an 
investment firm has to comply when providing services to its clients. These 
rules are supplemented by the MiFID II Delegated Regulation and the MiFID II 
Delegated Directive. Conduct-of-business rules are one of the mainstays of 
investor protection as outlined by the Foreword to Art 24 MiFID II. 
2. Level 2 and 3 Measures 
2 Level 2 measures include the following provisions of the MiFID II Delegated 
Regulation: Art 54 (assessment of suitability and suitability reports), Art 55 
(provisions common to the assessment of suitability or appropriateness), Art 56 
(assessment of appropriateness and related record-keeping obligations), 
Art 57 (provision of services in non-complex instruments), Art 58 (retail and 
professional client agreements), Art 59 (reporting obligations in respect of 
execution of orders other than for portfolio management), Art 60 (reporting 
obligations in respect of portfolio management), Art 61 (reporting obligations in 
respect of eligible counterparties), Art 62 (additional reporting obligations for 
portfolio management or contingent liability transactions), Art 63 (statements of 
client financial instruments or client funds), and Art 73 (record keeping of rights 
and obligations of the investment firm and the client). 
3 Additional level 3 measures include the ESMA, Guidelines for the assessment 
of knowledge and competence, 22 March 2016, ESMA/2015/1886; and ESMA, 
Guidelines on complex debt instruments and structured deposits, 4 February 
2016, ESMA/2015/1787. 
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II. Necessary knowledge and competence (Art 25(1)) 
4 Article 25(1) requires investment firms to demonstrate that their employees are 
competent to carry out the firm’s obligations under MiFID II. The 
appropriateness and suitability assessments in Arts 25(2) and (3) are context-
dependent and process-oriented. This makes enforcement and supervision 
more difficult and makes the ex-post benchmarking of financial advice a 
complex exercise. MiFID II aims to reduce these difficulties by providing that 
investment firms must demonstrate to competent authorities, on request, that 
natural persons giving investment advice or information to clients on behalf of 
the investment firm possess the necessary knowledge and competence to 
comply with the MiFID II rules of conduct. Investment firms shall allow their staff 
sufficient time and resources to achieve that knowledge and level of 
competence (see Recital 79 of MiFID II). ESMA has created guidelines that 
specify the criteria to assess knowledge and competence.142 
III. Suitability (Art 25(2)) 
5 The MiFID II suitability assessment is closely modelled on its predecessor 
provision in MiFID I. Suitability requirements apply to investment advice and 
portfolio management. These rules do not require a specific outcome, but are 
process-based and allow firms a degree of flexibility to take into account the 
nature of a client, the services provided and the products offered. The 
requirements are that an adviser/portfolio manager (a) gathers information 
about the relevant client (know your client), (b) assesses the suitability of the 
offered products or services for the client and (c) makes a personalised 
recommendation/trading decision on behalf of a client which reflects the client’s 
profile. In the realm of portfolio management, it is considered a 
recommendation when a portfolio manager advises a client to give or alter a 
mandate to a portfolio manager that defines the limits of the portfolio manager’s 
discretion.143 In an advisory situation, the suitability obligation will only apply if 
                                            
142  ESMA, Guidelines for the assessment of knowledge and competence, 22 March 2016, 
ESMA/2015/1886 
143  Recital 89 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
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the recommendation relates to a financial instrument.144 The suitability 
assessment does not just relate to recommendations to buy financial 
instruments but includes the advice not to buy, hold or sell a financial 
instrument.145 
1. Know your client 
6 Investment firms are required to obtain from their clients and potential clients 
necessary information in three areas: (a) the person’s knowledge and 
experience in the investment field relevant to the specific type of product or 
service being sold or advised on, (b) the person’s financial situation including 
the ability to bear losses and (c) the person’s investment objectives including 
risk tolerance. The aim of the information gathering obligation is to enable 
the firm to conduct the suitability assessment and to recommend investment 
services and financial instruments that are suitable to the client. Articles 54 and 
55 of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation supplement the requirements to obtain 
certain information from a client or potential client in relation to the suitability 
assessment. The requirements are closely modelled on the suitability regime 
in MiFID I’s Implementing Directive, which is why ESMA’s 2012 guidelines on 
suitability146 and ESMA’s opinion on the application of the MiFID I regime to the 
sale and marketing of complex products147 (which includes guidance on the 
suitability assessment) are still relevant for MiFID II, until ESMA updates these 
documents.148 
7 According to Art 54(2) of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation, an investment firm 
must obtain from potential clients and clients such information as is necessary 
for the firm to understand the essential facts about the client and to have a 
‘reasonable basis for determining’, having given due consideration to the nature 
and extent of the services provided, that a specific transaction satisfies three 
                                            
144  See the definition of investment advice in Art 4(1)(4). 
145  Recital 87 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
146  ESMA, Guidelines on certain aspects of the MiFID suitability requirements, 21 August 2012, 
ESMA/2012/387. 
147  ESMA, Opinion on MiFID practices for firms selling complex products, 7 February 2014, 
ESMA/2014/146. 
148  ESMA, Consultation Paper: Guidelines on certain aspects of the MiFID II suitability 
requirements, 13 July 2017, ESMA35-43-748. 
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criteria: (a) the transaction meets the client’s investment objectives, including 
the client’s risk tolerance; (b) the client is financially able to bear any related 
investment risks consistent with the client’s investment objectives; and (c) the 
client must have the necessary experience and knowledge in order to 
understand the risks involved in the transaction or in the management of the 
portfolio. These three criteria are relevant to determining the content and the 
amount of information that must be gathered by an investment firm from a client. 
When a firm provides investment services to a professional client it is entitled 
to assume that point (c) above is satisfied in relation to the products, 
transactions and services for which the client is classified as professional.149 
The exception for professional clients applies for all types of professional 
clients, and to both investment advice and portfolio management. Where a firm 
provides investment advice to a professional client covered by Section 1 of 
Annex II to the MiFID II, it can also assume that point (b) is satisfied.150 The 
exception relating to point (b) does not apply to portfolio management services 
or if a professional client is a reclassified retail client.  
8 The details of the information which investment firms are required to 
obtain from clients and potential client are subject to the proportionality 
principle; and may vary depending on the complexity, risks and structure of the 
financial instrument, on the nature of the client, and on the nature and extent of 
the service provided.151 It follows that with respect to transactions involving 
complex, risky or illiquid products, more in-depth information would need to be 
collected.152 If limited services are provided, for instance if a portfolio manager 
is appointed to manage a specific portfolio, less information may be required. 
For example, a portfolio manager in such case may only need information on a 
client’s risk tolerance in relation to the portfolio.153 
                                            
149  Art 54(3) subpara 1 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
150  Art 54(3) subpara 2 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
151  ESMA, Q & A on MiFID II and MiFIR investor protection and intermediaries topics, 10 July 2017, 
ESMA35-43-349, 2.7; cf Art 54(2) MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
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ESMA35-43-349, 2.7. 
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9 The information required to be collected concerning a potential client’s or 
client’s (referred to collectively as a ‘client’ in this section) financial situation 
includes, where relevant, information on the client’s source and extent of 
regular income, assets, investments, real property, and the client’s regular 
financial commitments (see Art 54(4) of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation). 
Information regarding a client’s investment objectives include, where relevant, 
the client’s investment time horizon, preferences for risk, risk profile and the 
purposes of an investment (see Art 54(5) of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation). 
Information related to a client’s knowledge and experience includes, to the 
extent appropriate given the nature of a client, the nature and extent of the 
service to be provided and the type of product or transaction envisaged, the 
following: (a) the types of services, transactions and financial instruments with 
which the client is familiar, (b) the nature, volume and frequency of the client’s 
transactions in financial instruments and the period over which they have been 
carried out and (c) the level of education and professional experiences of the 
client (see Art 55(1) of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation). It may not be 
necessary to gather all the information listed in Arts 54(4), (5) and Art 55(1), but 
a firm must be capable, on the basis of the information disclosed by a client, to 
conduct a suitability assessment. That may also mean that in a specific case a 
firm must obtain information that is not specifically listed in the non-exhaustive 
lists of information provided in the provisions discussed above. 
10 Article 54(7) of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation contains a non-exhaustive 
list of steps that a firm is required to undertake in order to ensure that 
reasonable steps are taken to collect reliable information from a client. An 
investment firm is entitled to rely on the information provided by its clients 
and potential clients unless it is aware or ought to be aware that the information 
is manifestly out of date, inaccurate or incomplete (see Art 55(3) of the MiFID 
II Delegated Regulation). An investment firm is not under a general obligation 
to verify information provided by a client. When an investment firms has an on-
going relationship with a client, it must have policies and procedures in place 
to maintain up-to-date information about the client.154 If a firm becomes aware 
that information provided by a client about her/his existing liabilities is not 
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accurate, it should refrain from giving investment advice or offering portfolio 
management services.155 Additionally, an investment firm must not discourage 
a client or potential client from providing information required under Art 25(2).156 
2. The suitability assessment 
11 A suitability assessment has three dimensions. The dimensions relate to a 
client’s investment objectives, financial ability to bear any related investment 
risks, and knowledge and experience (see Art 54(2) MiFID II Delegated 
Regulation). A suitability assessment is required each time an investment firm 
makes a recommendation to a client or makes a decision in relation to a 
portfolio. The specific transaction to be recommended or entered into must be 
compatible with respect to the relevant client in each of the three dimensions. 
If a firm provides investment advice recommending a bundled service/product 
package (see Art 24(11)), the overall bundled package must be suitable (see 
paragraph 2 of Art 25(2)). If an investment firm provides periodic suitability 
assessments to clients, it must review the suitability of the recommendations at 
least annually. The frequency of this assessment shall be increased depending 
on the risk profile of the client and the type of financial instruments 
recommended (see Art 54(13) of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation). 
12 If advice or portfolio management services are provided to a professional client, 
any modifications (see discussion above at paragraph 7) to the information 
which is required to be gathered applies mutatis mutandis to the suitability 
assessment. Article 54(9) of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation requires 
investment firms to have adequate policies and procedures in place to (a) 
ensure that a firm understands the investment services and financial 
instruments selected for its clients, and (b) assess, taking into account cost and 
complexity, whether equivalent investment services or financial instruments 
can meet the client’s profile. The latter requirement does not go as far as 
demanding that a firm assess whether an alternative instrument, less complex 
                                            
155  ESMA, Q & A on MiFID II and MiFIR investor protection and intermediaries topics, 10 July 2017, 
ESMA35-43-349, 2.7. 
156  Art 55(2) MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
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and with lower costs, would better meet the client’s profile.157 The relevant 
financial instrument or transaction must be suitable for the client, but it does 
not need to be the most suitable financial instrument. A transaction may, 
thus, be suitable for a client even if another transaction would have been more 
suitable.158 
13 When undertaking to conduct a suitability assessment, an investment firm must 
inform the relevant client or potential client, in a clear and simply way, that the 
reason for assessing suitability is to enable the firm to act in the client’s best 
interest.159 Paragraph 2 of Article 54(1) of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation 
clarifies that for investment firms offering advice using automated systems to 
assist in making personal recommendations or trading decisions, the 
responsibility to undertake the suitability assessment is not affected. 
Article 54(1), thus, clarifies that the suitability standards for simplified advice160 
are the same as for other forms of investment advice. Article 54(6) of the MiFID 
II Delegated Regulation provides guidance on determining who would be the 
subject of a suitability assessment and how the assessment may be done in 
practice, including from whom information should be collected if a client is a 
legal person, a group of natural persons or is represented by another natural 
person. 
14 Recital 82 of MiFID II highlights that the responsibility to undertake a 
suitability assessment lies with an investment firm. This responsibility cannot 
be delegated to a client, for example by simply asking whether a client has 
sufficient knowledge and experience in the relevant investment area. A 
transaction may be unsuitable for a client or potential client due to risks 
associated with the financial instruments, the type of transaction, the 
characteristics of an order or the frequency of trading.161 A series of 
transactions, each of which are suitable when viewed in isolation, may be 
                                            
157  Such was ESMA’s proposal in ESMA, Consultation paper on MiFID II/MiFIR, 22 May 2014, 
ESMA/2014/549, 134. 
158  Jonathan Herbst, A practitioner’s guide to MiFID II (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) 148. 
159  Art 54(1) subpara 1 sentence 2 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
160  Simplified advice means advice that is limited to one or more of a client’s specific needs and 
does not involve analysis of the client’s circumstances that are not directly relevant to those 
needs. 
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unsuitable if the recommendations or trades are made with a frequency that is 
not in the best interests of the client. In the case of portfolio management 
services, a transaction might also be unsuitable if it would result in an unsuitable 
portfolio. 
15 If an investment firm does not obtain the information required under 
Art 25(2), the firm cannot make a recommendation (see Art 54(8) of the MiFID 
II Delegated Regulation), but may be able to proceed with a transaction on a 
non-advised basis if the requirements of Art 25(3) or Art 25(4) are met. If a 
specific financial instrument is unsuitable for a client, its purchase cannot be 
recommended to the client. If the firm nonetheless influences the client to 
proceed with the transaction on a non-advised basis, such behaviour would 
breach the MiFID II conduct-of-business rules.162 It is, however, possible that 
an investment firm provides information to a client in order to increase the 
client’s knowledge for the purposes of determining whether a transaction or 
service is suitable to that client.163 Article 54(10) of the MiFID II Delegated 
Regulation clarifies that an investment adviser or portfolio manager shall not 
recommend or decide to trade where none of the relevant services or 
instruments are suitable for the client. If a client wishes to proceed with a 
transaction at her/his own initiative against the advice of the relevant 
investment firm that a specific financial instrument is not suitable for the client, 
the client must be clearly informed about the fact that the course of action is not 
suitable.164 The ‘unsuitable’ transaction may be executed under the 
appropriateness test (see discussion below at paragraph 17) or under the 
execution-only regime (see discussion below at paragraph 21). If a client is 
unwilling to fully disclose information about her or his financial situation, it may 
still be possible to assess the suitability of a potential transaction so long as the 
firm is capable of assessing whether the client’s assets are sufficient to bear 
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ESMA35-43-349, 2.6. 
163  Martin Brenncke, ‘Verständliche Risikoaufklärung und Schutz unkundiger Kleinanleger bei der 
Anlageberatung’ (2014) 26 Journal of Banking Law and Banking 366, 372-373. 
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any related investment risks, including any possible losses that may be 
incurred.165 
16 Article 54(11) of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation targets the malpractice of 
churning. Before an investment adviser or portfolio manager may change a 
client’s investments, it must undertake an analysis of the costs and benefits of 
the change, such that the firm is reasonably able to demonstrate that the 
benefits of any change are greater than the costs. 
IV. Appropriateness (Art 25(3)) 
17 Article 25(3) requires an investment firm to gather information (know your client) 
and to assess whether the investment service or product envisaged is 
appropriate for the client (appropriateness assessment). The appropriateness 
assessment must be conducted before an investment firm offers investment 
services other than investment advice and portfolio management. The test for 
appropriateness is significantly less burdensome than the test for suitability 
discussed in the section above. In practice, the appropriateness assessment 
typically relates to execution-only sales of complex products which do not 
qualify for MiFID II’s execution-only regime under Art 25(4), discussed below. 
The obligation to gather information requires an investment firm to ask a client 
or potential client for information166 regarding that person’s knowledge and 
experience with investments or services relevant to the specific type of product 
or service being offered.167 The detailed information is set out in Arts 55 (see 
discussion above at paragraph 9) and 56 of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
The depth and detail of the required information are subject to the 
proportionality principle. An investment firm is entitled to rely on the information 
provided by a client unless it is aware or ought to be aware that the information 
is manifestly out of date, inaccurate or incomplete (see Art 55(3) of the MiFID 
II Delegated Regulation).  
                                            
165  ESMA, Q & A on MiFID II and MiFIR investor protection and intermediaries topics, 10 July 2017, 
ESMA35-43-349, 2.7. 
166  Article 25(3) does not require the investment firm to actually obtain the information. 
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18 The aim of the information gathering required by Art 25(3) of MiFID II is to 
enable an investment firm to assess whether an investment service or product 
is appropriate for the relevant client, i.e. to determine whether the client has the 
necessary experience and knowledge in order to understand the risks involved 
in relation to the product or investment service offered or sought.168 An 
assessment of a client’s financial situation or investment objectives is not 
required. In relation to a professional client, an investment firm is entitled to 
assume that a professional client has the necessary experience and knowledge 
of the products, transactions and services for which the client is classified as 
professional.169 Therefore, the assessment for appropriateness does not add 
any additional obligations where a firm has ascertained that a client is a 
professional client. Where an investment firm plans to offer a bundle of services 
or products pursuant to Art 24(11), the appropriateness assessment must be 
undertaken in relation to the overall bundled package in accordance with the 
second sentence of Art 25(3).  
19 An appropriateness assessment can be, but does not need to be, performed 
on a transaction-by-transaction basis. A client’s knowledge and experience is, 
generally, unlikely to deteriorate over time. An investment firm may therefore 
identify a range of products or services carrying risks the client has the 
knowledge and experience to understand. The firm could proceed with a series 
of transactions and, at the time of each transaction, need only to assess that it 
fell within the permitted range.170 
20 An investment firm is not required to inform a client that a transaction is 
appropriate for that client. If a firm makes such a statement to the client, there 
is a risk that doing so could amount to a personal recommendation, triggering 
the requirement that the investment firm conduct a suitability assessment.171 
Where an investment firm considers that a product or service is not 
appropriate for a client, or where a client does not provide the required 
information or provides insufficient information, a firm must warn the relevant 
                                            
168  Art 56(1) subpara 1 MiFID II Delegated Regulation 
169  Art 56(1) subpara 2 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
170  Jonathan Herbst, A practitioner’s guide to MiFID II (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) 156. 
171  Jonathan Herbst, A practitioner’s guide to MiFID II (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) 157. 
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client (see paragraphs 2 and 3 of Art 25(3)). Yet, a firm may proceed with a 
transaction even in that case if the relevant client wishes to proceed with the 
transaction. A firm must not discourage a potential client or client from providing 
information generally required under Art 25(3).172 Neither must an investment 
firm encourage a client to ignore a warning and proceed with a transaction.173 
Article 56(2) of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation specifies what records 
investment firms must maintain in relation to appropriateness assessments. 
V. Execution-only (Art 25(4)) 
21 Article 25(4) creates the execution-only regime which applies to investment 
services which consist only of execution or reception and transmission of client 
orders. Article 25(4) also applies when, in the primary market, investment firms 
distribute financial instruments issued by them without providing any advice 
(see Recital 45 of MiFID II). Article 25(4)(a) identifies six classes of non-
complex financial instruments which a firm may sell to a client without 
performing a suitability or appropriateness test. The final class listed, ‘other 
non-complex financial instruments’, is further defined in Art 57 of the MiFID 
II Delegated Regulation, which specifies six criteria which a financial instrument 
must meet in order to be considered a non-complex financial instrument for the 
purposes of Art 25(4)(a)(vi). Complex products may only be sold on an advised 
basis or following an appropriateness assessment. With regard to three of the 
six classes of financial instruments referred to in Art 25(4)(a), execution-only 
services are excluded if the financial instrument involved incorporates a 
structure which makes it difficult for the client to understand the risk 
involved. ESMA’s guidelines on complex debt instruments and structured 
deposits specify the criteria for the assessment whether debt instruments 
incorporate such a structure.174 The guidelines also clarify the meaning of 
‘embedded derivatives’, a term expressly used in three of the six classes of 
financial instruments listed in Art 25(4)(a). Instruments explicitly excluded from 
the list of non-complex financial instruments in Art 25(4)(a)(i)-(v) are 
                                            
172  Art 55(2) MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
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automatically deemed to be complex. These expressly excluded financial 
instruments cannot be considered as ‘other non-complex financial instrument’ 
under Art 25(4)(a)(vi).175 
22 Article 25(4) further requires that the service is provided at the initiative of the 
client, that the client must be warned that an appropriateness assessment will 
not be performed in accordance with Art 25(3), and that, therefore, the client 
will not benefit from the protection which such an assessment may provide. 
Reflecting one aim of MiFID II, to enhance investor protection, and evidence 
that prior to the financial crisis retail investors were sold high risk and complex 
products,176 Art 25(4) takes a tougher stance on the execution-only business 
than the previous regulatory regime under MiFID I and limits the range of 
financial instruments which firms can sell through execution-only distribution 
channels. In particular, Art 25(4) has removed structured UCITs from the 
category of non-complex products. It also prohibits investment firms from 
granting credits or loans (other than existing credit limits of loans, current 
accounts and overdraft facilities) to investors in conjunction with execution-only 
services in order to enable investors to carry out a transaction because loans 
increase a client’s leverage, risk and the complexity of the transaction. Granting 
credits or loans may make it more difficult to understand the risks involved (see 
Recital 80 of MiFID II). Article 25(4) does not address (a) poor investor 
outcomes due to behavioural factors such as under-diversification or 
overconfidence, and (b) questions raised by excessive trading by retail 
investors. 
23 Recital 85 of MiFID II clarifies that a service is considered to be provided at the 
initiative of a client (in all cases) unless a client demands the service in 
response to a personalised communication from, or on behalf of, a firm to the 
particular client and which contains an invitation or is intended to influence the 
client in respect of a specific financial instrument or specific transaction. The 
wording of Recital 85 of MiFID II (‘unless’) indicates that a personalised 
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communication to a particular client that does not contain an invitation and is 
not intended to influence the client in respect of a specific financial instrument 
or transaction may still be considered at the initiative of the client under 
Art 25(4)(b). An example of the latter category is a personal communication 
relating generally to the firm’s brokerage services without identifying particular 
financial instruments or transactions. This condition set out in Art 24(4)(b) is 
also met if a client demands a service on the basis of any communication of a 
general nature containing a promotion or offer of financial instruments 
addressed to the public or a large group or category of (potential) clients (e.g. 
newspaper advert, public website). 
VI. Client agreements (Art 25(5)) 
24 Article 25(5) creates a duty to establish a record of client agreements. It must 
be retained for at least the duration of the relationship with the relevant client.177 
Investment firms (other than investment advisers) are obliged to enter into a 
written basic agreement with each retail or professional client, in a durable 
medium, which sets out the essential rights and obligations of the firm and the 
client.178 Investment advisers are also bound by this obligation but only when 
an adviser provides periodic suitability assessments.179 Paragraph 2 of 
Article 58 of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation specifies the necessary 
contents of a client agreement. There are no express requirements as to the 
method of obtaining a client’s consent to an agreement; consent is governed 
by national contract law. An investment firm is obliged to provide a client with 
the terms of the agreement under Art 46(1) of the MiFID II Delegated 
Regulation. The latter obligation and the record-keeping requirement under 
Art 25(5) apply to all client agreements, even if an investment firm is not 
positively required to enter into such an agreement. 
VII. Reporting to clients (Art 25(6)) 
1. General reporting obligation 
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25 The client reporting obligation set out in Art 25(6) of MiFID II aims to support 
monitoring of investment activities by investors and to strengthen investment 
firms’ compliance incentives through the use of client reports, which must be 
provided to clients in a durable medium. MiFID II extends the reporting 
obligation to include periodic communications, taking into account the type and 
complexity of financial instruments involved and the nature of services provided 
to a client. The reporting obligation applies to all clients, but investment firms 
can agree with eligible counterparties to standards regarding the content and 
timing of reports which differ from those generally applicable to retail and 
professional clients (see Art 61 of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation). 
26 Specific reporting requirements are set out in Arts 59 through 63 of the MiFID 
II Delegated Regulation in relation to the execution of orders, portfolio 
management activities and holding client assets. In respect of portfolio 
management, Art 60 of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation provides 
requirements for periodic statements, including their content and how often a 
statement must be provided to a client. A periodic statement must provide a fair 
and balanced review of the activities undertaken and of the performance of the 
portfolio during the relevant reporting period. A periodic statement does not 
have to be provided if clients have access to an online system that qualifies 
as a durable medium,180 that contains up-to-date valuations of the client’s 
portfolio and where the other conditions set out in Art 60(3)(a) of the MiFID II 
Delegated Regulation are satisfied. Portfolio managers need to inform a client 
when the overall value of the client’s portfolio depreciates by 10%, and 
thereafter at multiples of 10% under Art 62(1) of the MiFID II Delegated 
Regulation. It is sufficient for this purpose if a portfolio manager evaluates the 
overall portfolio at least once each day, e.g. via a fixed portfolio valuation point 
for each day.181 Investment firms that hold a retail client account that includes 
positions in leveraged financial instruments or contingent liability transactions 
must inform the client when the initial value of each instrument depreciates by 
10% and thereafter at multiples of 10% (see Art 62(2) MiFID II Delegated 
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Regulation). It is sufficient if a firm sets a fixed daily valuation point for its 
leveraged financial instruments or contingent liability transactions in order to 
identify whether there has been a depreciation by 10% or more.182  
27 Article 63 of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation stipulates the frequency and 
content of the statement of client assets that investment firms have to provide 
to clients if the firm holds client financial instruments or client funds. The 
statement shall not be provided if a client has access to an online system which 
qualifies as a durable medium and contains up-to-date statements of the 
client’s financial instruments or funds, and where the other conditions of 
paragraph 3 of Art 63(2) of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation are fulfilled. 
Portfolio managers that hold financial instruments or funds can include a 
statement of client assets in the periodic statement the manager must provide 
to clients pursuant to Art 60(1) of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation.183 
2. Suitability statement 
28 A suitability statement is required under paragraph 2 of Art 25(6) when an 
investment firm provides investment advice to a retail client. The suitability 
statement must specify the advice given and how the advice meets the 
preferences, objectives and other characteristics of the retail client. This 
requirement is amplified by Art 54(12) of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation. For 
example, a suitability statement must indicate to a retail client whether the 
recommended services or instruments are likely to require the retail client to 
seek a periodic review of the arrangements.184 That circumstance is likely to 
occur where advice is likely to be needed to rebalance a portfolio. The 
necessary level of detail required in a suitability statement must reflect the 
purpose of the report, which is to prove whether the recommendation given 
was, in fact, suitable for the client. It should contain the date and time of the 
day when the relevant advice was given,185 and it must be provided in a durable 
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medium before the relevant transaction is made. A durable medium may also 
be in electronic form (see Recital 82 of MiFID II).186 A suitability statement can 
thus be made available to a client in a secured area of an investment firm’s 
website, so long as the client receives a notification regarding the availability of 
the document.187 According to ESMA, a suitability statement has to be provided 
to a retail client when that client has been provided with investment advice, 
irrespective of whether or not the advice is followed by a transaction and 
irrespective of the specific recommendation given, including advice not to buy, 
hold or sell a financial instrument.188 Special conditions apply to suitability 
statements where the agreement to buy or sell a financial instrument is 
concluded using a means of distance communication that prevents the prior 
delivery of the suitability statement (see paragraph 3 of Art 25(6)). Where a firm 
is subject to several record-keeping and documentation obligations in 
connection with the provision of investment advice, e.g. the obligations set out 
in Arts 16(6), 25(6) and 16(7) in relation to records of face-to-face 
conversations, an investment firm may draft one single document so long as it 
complies with all corresponding requirements.189 
29 When portfolio management services are provided to a retail client, or when an 
investment firm has informed a retail client that it will carry out a periodic 
assessment of suitability, the periodic report must contain an updated 
suitability statement in accordance with paragraph 4 of Art 25(6). An updated 
suitability statement may cover only the changes in the services provided or 
instruments involved, and/or any change in the circumstances of the client 
since the last statement, and may not need to include all the details contained 
in an earlier suitability statement.190 
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Article 26 – Provision of services through the medium of another 
investment firm 
Member States shall allow an investment firm receiving an instruction to provide investment or ancillary 
services on behalf of a client through the medium of another investment firm to rely on client information 
transmitted by the latter investment firm. The investment firm which mediates the instructions will 
remain responsible for the completeness and accuracy of the information transmitted. 
The investment firm which receives an instruction to undertake services on behalf of a client in that way 
shall also be able to rely on any recommendations in respect of the service or transaction that have 
been provided to the client by another investment firm. The investment firm which mediates the 
instructions will remain responsible for the suitability for the client of the recommendations or advice 
provided. 
The investment firm which receives client instructions or orders through the medium of another 
investment firm shall remain responsible for concluding the service or transaction, based on any such 
information or recommendations, in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Title. 
 
I. General Features 
1. Purpose 
1 Article 26(1) and (2) of MiFID II facilitate, and make more efficient, the fulfilment 
of conduct-of-business obligations when an investment firm transmits (the 
‘mediating firm’) an instruction to another investment firm (the ‘dealing firm’) to 
provide investment or ancillary services on behalf of a client of the mediating 
firm. In practice, the provision becomes relevant when external investment 
advisers or portfolio managers cooperate with investment firms to execute 
client orders. 
II. Comment 
2 Article 20 is applicable when an investment firm receives an instruction from 
another investment firm to provide investment or ancillary services on behalf of 
a client. In that case, the dealing investment firm knows that its services are for 
the end client. Article 20 does not apply if an investment firm is acting on its 
own behalf. Since the dealing investment firm ultimately concludes the service 
or transaction (see paragraph 3 of Art 26), it must, in principle, comply with the 
conduct-of-business obligations in relation to the ultimate client. This leads to 
duplication of the conduct-of-business rules, since the mediating 
investment firm is also required to fulfil its conduct-of-business obligations in 
relation to its client. For example, both the mediating and dealing firms would 
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need to categorise the client. Yet, the dealing investment firm often has no 
direct relationship with the ultimate client. Thus, it appears justified that the 
dealing investment firm can comply with the disclosure requirements under 
Arts 24(4), (5), the record keeping obligation pursuant to Art 25(5), and the 
reporting to clients requirement under Art 25(6) by employing the mediating 
investment firm as an agent.191 
3 Articles 26(1) and (2) facilitate dealing investment firms, since dealing 
investment firms can rely on client information transmitted by the mediating 
investment firm, and on any recommendations in respect of the service or 
transaction that have been provided to the client by the mediating investment 
firm. A mediating investment firm remains responsible for the completeness 
and accuracy of the information it transmits and the suitability of the 
recommendations or advice provided to a client. If a mediating investment firm 
is a financial adviser or portfolio manager, the dealing investment firm can 
assume that the specific financial instrument or service is suitable for the client. 
If the mediating investment firm does not provide client information or if this 
information is incomplete, the dealing investment firm must obtain this 
information before providing the relevant service.192 
 
Article 27 – Obligation to execute orders on terms most favourable to the 
client 
1.   Member States shall require that investment firms take all sufficient steps to obtain, when executing 
orders, the best possible result for their clients taking into account price, costs, speed, likelihood of 
execution and settlement, size, nature or any other consideration relevant to the execution of the order. 
Nevertheless, where there is a specific instruction from the client the investment firm shall execute the 
order following the specific instruction. 
Where an investment firm executes an order on behalf of a retail client, the best possible result shall 
be determined in terms of the total consideration, representing the price of the financial instrument and 
the costs relating to execution, which shall include all expenses incurred by the client which are directly 
relating to the execution of the order, including execution venue fees, clearing and settlement fees and 
any other fees paid to third parties involved in the execution of the order. 
                                            
191  cf Peter Mülbert, ‘The eclipse of contract law in the investment firm-client-relationship: the 
impact of the MiFID on the law of contract from a German perspective’ in Guido Ferrarini and 
Eddy Wymeersch (eds), Investor protection in Europe: corporate law making, the MiFID and 
beyond (Oxford University Press 2006) 299, 313 for Art 19(3), (8) MiFID I; Juliane Thieme, 
Wertpapierdienstleistungen (Nomos 2008) 453 for Art 19(7) MiFID I. 
192  Juliane Thieme, Wertpapierdienstleistungen (Nomos 2008) 453. 
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For the purposes of delivering best possible result in accordance with the first subparagraph where 
there is more than one competing venue to execute an order for a financial instrument, in order to 
assess and compare the results for the client that would be achieved by executing the order on each 
of the execution venues listed in the investment firm’s order execution policy that is capable of executing 
that order, the investment firm’s own commissions and the costs for executing the order on each of the 
eligible execution venues shall be taken into account in that assessment. 
2.   An investment firm shall not receive any remuneration, discount or non-monetary benefit for routing 
client orders to a particular trading venue or execution venue which would infringe the requirements on 
conflicts of interest or inducements set out in paragraph 1 of this Article and Article 16(3) and Articles 
23 and 24. 
3.   Member States shall require that for financial instruments subject to the trading obligation in Articles 
23 and 28 Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 each trading venue and systematic internaliser and for other 
financial instruments each execution venue makes available to the public, without any charges, data 
relating to the quality of execution of transactions on that venue on at least an annual basis and that 
following execution of a transaction on behalf of a client the investment firm shall inform the client where 
the order was executed. Periodic reports shall include details about price, costs, speed and likelihood 
of execution for individual financial instruments. 
4.   Member States shall require investment firms to establish and implement effective arrangements 
for complying with paragraph 1. In particular, Member States shall require investment firms to establish 
and implement an order execution policy to allow them to obtain, for their client orders, the best possible 
result in accordance with paragraph 1. 
5.   The order execution policy shall include, in respect of each class of financial instruments, 
information on the different venues where the investment firm executes its client orders and the factors 
affecting the choice of execution venue. It shall at least include those venues that enable the investment 
firm to obtain on a consistent basis the best possible result for the execution of client orders. 
Member States shall require that investment firms provide appropriate information to their clients on 
their order execution policy. That information shall explain clearly, in sufficient detail and in a way that 
can be easily understood by clients, how orders will be executed by the investment firm for the client. 
Member States shall require that investment firms obtain the prior consent of their clients to the order 
execution policy. 
Member States shall require that, where the order execution policy provides for the possibility that client 
orders may be executed outside a trading venue, the investment firm shall, in particular, inform its 
clients about that possibility. Member States shall require that investment firms obtain the prior express 
consent of their clients before proceeding to execute their orders outside a trading venue. Investment 
firms may obtain such consent either in the form of a general agreement or in respect of individual 
transactions. 
6.   Member States shall require investment firms who execute client orders to summarise and make 
public on an annual basis, for each class of financial instruments, the top five execution venues in terms 
of trading volumes where they executed client orders in the preceding year and information on the 
quality of execution obtained. 
7.   Member States shall require investment firms who execute client orders to monitor the effectiveness 
of their order execution arrangements and execution policy in order to identify and, where appropriate, 
correct any deficiencies. In particular, they shall assess, on a regular basis, whether the execution 
venues included in the order execution policy provide for the best possible result for the client or whether 
they need to make changes to their execution arrangements, taking account of, inter alia, the 
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information published under paragraphs 3 and 6. Member States shall require investment firms to notify 
clients with whom they have an ongoing client relationship of any material changes to their order 
execution arrangements or execution policy. 
8.   Member States shall require investment firms to be able to demonstrate to their clients, at their 
request, that they have executed their orders in accordance with the investment firm’s execution policy 
and to demonstrate to the competent authority, at its request, their compliance with this Article. 
9.   The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 89 
concerning: 
(a) the criteria for determining the relative importance of the different factors that, pursuant to 
paragraph 1, may be taken into account for determining the best possible result taking into 
account the size and type of order and the retail or professional nature of the client; 
(b) factors that may be taken into account by an investment firm when reviewing its execution 
arrangements and the circumstances under which changes to such arrangements may be 
appropriate. In particular, the factors for determining which venues enable investment firms to 
obtain on a consistent basis the best possible result for executing the client orders; 
(c) the nature and extent of the information to be provided to clients on their execution policies, 
pursuant to paragraph 5. 
10.   ESMA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to determine: 
(a) the specific content, the format and the periodicity of data relating to the quality of execution to be 
published in accordance with paragraph 3, taking into account the type of execution venue and 
the type of financial instrument concerned; 
(b) the content and the format of information to be published by investment firms in accordance with 
paragraph 6. 
ESMA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 3 July 2015. 
Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the 
first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. 
 
I. General Features 
1. Purpose 
1 Best-execution obligations form a fundamental element of investor protection 
because the obligations mitigate against conflict of interest risk inherent when 
investment firms execute orders.193 The best-execution obligations are also 
necessary to mitigate possible problems associated with market 
                                            
193  Niamh Moloney, EU securities and financial markets regulation (3rd edn, Oxford University 
Press 2014) 519-520. 
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fragmentation.194 Best execution aims to ensure that trading information made 
available under transparency obligations results in changes to the order-routing 
decisions of investment firms in order to seek out the best bargains for their 
clients.195 Competition between trading venues is intended to improve the 
quality of execution services for end-investors and to cause trading volume to 
flow to the most efficient trading venue. MiFID II’s best execution requirements 
are designed to promote both market efficiency generally, and lead to better 
results for investors individually. The central difficulty has been how to 
objectively measure best execution, which is difficult in respect of most asset 
classes with the exception of highly liquid shares. MiFID II aims at improving its 
best-execution rules by requiring greater transparency of the quality of 
execution services in different execution venues.196 
2. Level 2 and 3 Measures 
2 Level 2 measures in respect of Art 27 of MiFID II include the following: Art 64 
(best execution criteria) and Art 66 (execution policy) of the MiFID II Delegated 
Regulation; the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/575;197 and the 
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/576.198 
II. The best possible results for clients (Art 27(1)) 
3 Article 27(1) contains the core obligation of the best-execution regime: 
Investment firms must take all sufficient steps to obtain, when executing orders, 
the best possible result for their clients. The obligation arises only where a firm 
executes orders on behalf of clients, i.e. when a firm owes contractual 
                                            
194  Commission, MiFID I proposal, 19 November 2002, COM(2002) 625 final, 26; Commission, 
Background note to draft MiFID I Implementing Directive, 6 February 2006, 7.7. 
195  Commission, MiFID I proposal, 19 November 2002, COM(2002) 625 final, 14, 26. 
196  cf Commission, Public consultation: review of MiFID, 8 December 2010, 63; Recital 92 MiFID 
II. 
197  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/575 of 8.6.2016 supplementing Directive 
2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on markets in financial instruments 
with regard to regulatory technical standards concerning the data to be published by execution 
venues on the quality of execution of transactions (OJ EU, L 87/152). 
198  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/576 of 8.6.2016 supplementing Directive 
2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical 
standards for the annual publication by investment firms of information on the identity of 
execution venues and on the quality of execution (OJ EU, L 87/166). 
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obligations to a client or has established an agency relationship with a client.199 
Recital 103 of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation clarifies that the MiFID II best-
execution obligations apply when an investment firm deals on own account200 
with a client and the circumstances result in the firm acting on behalf of the 
client.201 The best-execution obligation applies on an order-by-order basis: 
the selection of an entity or entities to execute an order, from among entities 
which are included in the execution policy of the relevant firm, must be done on 
an order-by-order basis.202 That does not mean that an investment firm must 
obtain the best possible results for its clients on every single occasion. Rather, 
firms need to verify on an on-going basis that their execution arrangements 
work well throughout the different stages of the order-execution process.203 The 
requirement that a firm take ‘sufficient’ steps is a higher bar for compliance 
than was required under MiFID I, which required ‘reasonable’ steps. According 
to ESMA, the change to ‘sufficient’ highlights that firms’ execution policies and 
arrangements must be able to detect potential deficiencies. Firms must not only 
monitor the quality of execution services, but also the quality of their execution 
arrangements and policies on an ex-ante and ex-post basis. If any deficiencies 
are detected, a firm must take all appropriate remedial action in order to 
demonstrate that they have taken ‘all sufficient steps’.204 
4 The obligation under Art 27(1) discussed above limits the possibility for internal 
execution to situations where this such execution would match, or better, the 
terms at which the client order could be finalised on a regulated market or in 
the wider market.205 Since the best price may not always represent the best 
                                            
199  Recital 91 MiFID II. 
200  Dealing on own account is defined in Art 4(1)(6) MiFID II. 
201  Recital 91 MiFID II circumscribes Recital 103 MiFID II Delegated Regulation; cf Commission, 
Best execution – scope issues under Mifid and the implementing directive, Working document 
ESC-07-2007, 19.3.2007, para 5. 
202  Commission, Background note to draft MiFID I Implementing Directive, 6 February 2006, para 
7.7.1. 
203  ESMA, Q & A on MiFID II and MiFIR investor protection and intermediaries topics, 10 July 2017, 
ESMA35-43-349, 1.1. 
204  Ibid. 
205  Commission, MiFID I proposal, 19 November 2002, COM(2002) 625 final, 19. 
Martin Brenncke  72 
possible result for the client,206 the provision clarifies that the best possible 
result for the client is not only based on the price obtained, but also on other 
factors relevant to the execution of an order, such as trading costs, speed of 
execution, nature of the financial instrument and the order, likelihood of 
execution, and settlement or size. The flexibility of what constitutes best 
execution under MiFID II is also intended to foster competition between 
execution venues.207 The second sentence of Art 27(1) provides autonomy to 
investors by providing that an investment firm must execute an order according 
to the specific instruction of a client if such an instruction exists. Article 64(2) of 
the MiFID II Delegated Regulation clarifies that a firm fulfils its obligation to take 
all sufficient steps to obtain the best possible result for a client to the extent that 
it follows specific instructions from a client relating to an order or specific 
aspects of an order. A firm can invite a client to choose between two or more 
specified trading venues, provided that those venues are consistent with the 
execution policy of the firm.208 
5 Due to the limited ability of retail clients to monitor an investment firm for 
compliance with its best-execution obligations, Art 27(1) sets a clear 
benchmark for the execution of retail client orders:209 The total consideration 
paid by a client, consisting of the price of the financial instrument and the costs 
of executing the order, including all expenses incurred by the client which are 
directly relating to the execution of the order, should be the most important 
factor in determining what constitutes the best possible result for the purposes 
of the best-execution obligation (see paragraph 2 of Art 27(1)). Even though 
MiFID II does not prescribe that the benchmark should be the total 
consideration of the order, when a firm executes an order on behalf of a 
professional client, it is justified to consider price and cost as relatively 
important to obtaining the best possible results for professional clients.210 
                                            
206  Guido Ferrarini, ‘Best execution and competition between trading venues – MiFID’s likely 
impact’ (2007) 2 Capital Markets Law Journal 404, 407. 
207  Ibid.  
208  Recital 102 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
209  Commission, Background note to draft MiFID I Implementing Directive, 6 February 2006, para 
7.7.3. 
210  CESR, Q & A on best execution under MiFID, May 2007, CESR/07-320, 11.3. 
Martin Brenncke  73 
6 When an investment firm assesses and compares execution venues211 from 
among the venues included in the firm’s execution policy to select a venue for 
a particular transaction, it must take into account its own commissions and the 
costs of executing the order on each of the eligible execution venues.212 
Investment firms may not structure their commissions in such a way as to 
discriminate unfairly between execution venues, e.g. by imposing different 
charges for different venues which do not reflect actual differences in execution 
costs to the firm.213 An investment firm is, however, not obliged to compare the 
results of any order executed in accordance with its own execution policy, 
commissions and fees with the results that another investment firm could 
achieve applying different policies and parameters. Nor is an investment firm 
required to compare the differences in its own commissions which are 
attributable to differences in the nature of services provided to clients (see 
Recital 93 of MiFID II).  
7 Article 64(1) of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation sets out, in general terms, 
the criteria which firms must take into account when determining the relative 
importance of the different factors which contribute to best execution as listed 
in Art 27(1). Best-execution obligations should be applied in a manner that 
takes into account the different circumstances associated with the execution of 
orders related to particular types of financial instruments.214 Article 64(4) of the 
MiFID II Delegated Regulation strengthens the best-execution standard in 
relation to OTC products by obliging firms to check the fairness of the price 
proposed to the client prior to the execution of the order. These checks must 
be undertaken on a systematic basis, embedded in firms’ policies and 
practices, and require that appropriate valuation systems are in place.215 
8 An investment firm transmitting or placing orders with other entities for 
execution may select a single entity to execute the firm’s orders exclusively 
where an investment firm is able to show that the arrangement allows it to 
                                            
211  Defined in 64(1) subpara 2 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
212  Art 27(1) subpara 3, Recital 93 MiFID II. 
213  Art 64(3) MiFID II Delegated Regulation; Recital 95 MiFID II. 
214  Recital 104 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
215  ESMA, Q & A on MiFID II and MiFIR investor protection and intermediaries topics, 10 July 2017, 
ESMA35-43-349, 1.2.  
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obtain the best possible result for its clients on a consistent basis, and where it 
can reasonably expect that the selected entity will enable it to obtain results for 
clients that are at least as good as the results that it reasonably could expect 
from using alternative entities for execution. The reasonable expectation should 
be supported by relevant data published in accordance with Art 27 or by internal 
analysis conducted by an investment firm.216 When using only a single venue 
to execute orders, the specific way that an investment firm executes the order 
is important in fulfilling the best-execution obligation.217 Using a single venue to 
execute orders does not diminish a firm’s responsibility to monitor the quality of 
execution, nor the obligation to regularly assess the market landscape to 
determine whether or not there are alternative venues that the firm could use.218 
III. Inducements for routing client orders (Art 27(2)) 
9 Article 27(2) clarifies that investment firms must not receive any remuneration, 
discount or non-monetary benefit for routing client orders to a particular 
execution venue or entity which would infringe the relevant requirements on 
conflicts of interest or inducements. If a firm receives inducements from an 
execution venue, the investment firm must comply with Art 24(9) and inform its 
clients about the inducements in its execution policy.219 Where a firm charges 
more than one participant in a transaction, to comply with regulations regarding 
inducements, it shall inform its clients in its execution policy of the value of any 
inducement received (see Art 66(7) of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation). 
IV. Publishing periodic reports (Art 27(3)) and the top 5 execution venues 
(Art 27(6)) 
10 MiFID II requires trading venues, systemic internalisers, and execution venues 
to publish, without charge, data on the quality of execution services provided 
through the venue on at least an annual basis. These periodic reports must 
include details about price, costs, speed and likelihood of execution for 
                                            
216  Recital 100 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
217  For details see ESMA, Q & A on MiFID II and MiFIR investor protection and intermediaries 
topics, 10 July 2017, ESMA35-43-349, 1.3. 
218  Ibid. 
219  Art 66(6) MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
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individual financial instruments. According to ESMA, these reports should be 
kept available in the public domain for a minimum period of two years.220 
Investment firms must also inform clients on what venue orders have been 
executed. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/575 further specifies 
the content, the format and the periodicity of data relating to the quality of 
execution services, taking into account the type of execution venue and the 
type of financial instrument concerned. 
11 Increased transparency is intended to improve compliance with, and the ability 
to assess, best-execution obligations under MiFID II.221 Investment firms must 
use the data provided by execution venues to compare and select the venues 
the firm uses on a regular basis.222 Investment firms are, in turn, required to 
publish annually their top-five execution venues per class of financial 
instrument in terms of trading volume, as well as information about the quality 
of the execution services obtained (see Art 27(6)). This is ultimately intended 
to be a mechanism to allow the public and investors to compare the quality of 
execution practices among investment firms, and to improve clients’ 
understanding and scrutiny of order execution quality.223 Commission 
Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/576 further specifies the content and the 
format of disclosures regarding the top-five most used execution venues by an 
investment firm, and on the quality of execution to be published by investment 
firms. According to ESMA, firms should keep these reports available in the 
public domain for a minimum period of two years.224 Due to differences among 
how investment firms obtain the best possible result for retail clients, as 
compared to professional clients, the Regulation specifies that information 
about the top five execution venues must be provided separately for retail and 
professional clients. Annex I of the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 
2017/576 sets out the relevant classes of financial instruments. 
                                            
220  ESMA, Q & A on MiFID II and MiFIR investor protection and intermediaries topics, 10 July 2017, 
ESMA35-43-349, 1.4. 
221  Commission, MiFID II proposal, 20 October 2011, COM(2011) 656 final, 8. 
222  Recital 107 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
223  Recital 1 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/576; cf Recital 97 MiFID II. 
224  ESMA, Q & A on MiFID II and MiFIR investor protection and intermediaries topics, 10 July 2017, 
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V. Order execution policies (Arts 27(4), (5), and (7)) 
12 Investment firms must have effective processes in place to ensure compliance 
with the core best-execution obligation. In particular, firms must establish and 
implement an order execution policy under Art 27(4). Formulating this policy 
generally involves a three-step approach.225 First, (1) an investment firm 
should establish the relative importance of, or at least a process for establishing 
the relative importance of, the execution factors mentioned in Art 27(1), taking 
into account the criteria listed in Art 64(1) of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
Second, (2) in accordance with Art 27(5), a firm should analyse the available 
execution venues, select those venues that enable it to obtain the best possible 
result on a consistent basis, and take the necessary steps to make it possible 
to execute its client orders on those venues. Third, (3) client orders should be 
routed, on an order-by-order basis, to the appropriate venues, taking into 
account the relative importance of the execution factors as set out in the firm’s 
policy. 
13 When determining what execution venues should be included in a firm’s 
execution policy (see Art 27(5)), an investment firm’s own commissions or fees 
charged to the client for the provision of an investment service should not be 
taken into account (Recital 94 of MiFID II). MiFID II also clarifies that an 
investment firm violates its best-execution obligations if it charges a different 
commission or spread to clients for execution on different execution venues 
and that difference does not reflect actual differences in the cost to the firm of 
executing on the relevant venues.226 Investment firms must also disclose 
appropriate information to their clients about their order execution policy 
which explains, clearly, in sufficient detail, and in a way that can be easily 
understood by clients, how orders will be executed by the investment firm for 
the relevant client (see Art 27(5)). Article 27(5) regulates the manner of 
disclosure, which resulted from concerns that information provided by 
investment firms in order execution policies under the MiFID I rules was often 
                                            
225  Commission, Background note to draft MiFID I Implementing Directive, 6 February 2006, para 
7.7.1; cf Recital 99 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
226  Recital 95 MiFID II. 
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generic and formulaic.227 Firms must also obtain the prior consent from their 
clients to the order execution policy, which may be obtained, for example, when 
establishing the business relationship. Paragraph 3 of Art 27(5) targets 
execution of orders performed outside a trading venue and reflects MiFID II’s 
aim that trading be organised on regulated trading venues. Paragraph 3 of 
Art 27(5) requires that investment firms obtain the prior express consent of their 
clients before proceeding to execute orders outside a trading venue. 
14 Articles 66(2) through (9) of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation sets out specific 
requirements relating to the content of an execution policy. Requirements of 
an execution policy include, for example, that (a) the information on the 
execution policy shall be customised depending on the class of a financial 
instrument and the type of the service provided, and that (b) the execution 
policy shall be provided to a client in good time and prior to the provision of the 
relevant service. A firm has to include a list of the venues that the firm ordinarily 
uses, as well as a list of the quantitative and qualitative factors used to select 
an execution venue on the list. Where an investment firm executes orders for 
retail clients, it must provide those clients with a summary of the relevant policy, 
focused on the total costs they incur. The order execution policy should take 
into account the particular characteristics of securities financing transactions, 
and it should list execution venues for these transactions separately.228 
15 Article 27(7) requires investment firms to monitor the effectiveness of their 
order execution arrangements and execution policies in order to identify and 
correct any deficiencies. A firm must notify clients with whom it has an ongoing 
client relationship of any material changes to its order execution arrangements 
or execution policy. Article 66(1) of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation sets out 
the requirements for when a review of the execution policy and order execution 
arrangements must occur. Investment firms are required to review their 
execution policy and order execution arrangements at least annually, and also 
whenever a material change occurs that affects the firm’s ability to obtain the 
best possible result for the execution of its client orders. A material change is a 
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228  Recital 99 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
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significant event that could impact best-execution factors referred to in 
Art 27(1).229 
 
Article 28 – Client order handling rules 
1.   Member States shall require that investment firms authorised to execute orders on behalf of clients 
implement procedures and arrangements which provide for the prompt, fair and expeditious execution 
of client orders, relative to other client orders or the trading interests of the investment firm. 
Those procedures or arrangements shall allow for the execution of otherwise comparable client orders 
in accordance with the time of their reception by the investment firm. 
2.   Member States shall require that, in the case of a client limit order in respect of shares admitted to 
trading on a regulated market or traded on a trading venue which are not immediately executed under 
prevailing market conditions, investment firms are, unless the client expressly instructs otherwise, to 
take measures to facilitate the earliest possible execution of that order by making public immediately 
that client limit order in a manner which is easily accessible to other market participants. Member States 
may decide that investment firms comply with that obligation by transmitting the client limit order to a 
trading venue. Member States shall provide that the competent authorities may waive the obligation to 
make public a limit order that is large in scale compared with normal market size as determined under 
Article 4 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014. 
3.   The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 89 to 
define: 
(a) the conditions and nature of the procedures and arrangements which result in the prompt, fair and 
expeditious execution of client orders and the situations in which or types of transaction for which 
investment firms may reasonably deviate from prompt execution so as to obtain more favourable 
terms for clients; 
(b) the different methods through which an investment firm can be deemed to have met its obligation 
to disclose not immediately executable client limit orders to the market. 
 
I. General Features 
1. Purpose 
1 The rules applicable to handling client orders are designed to enhance 
confidence in the impartiality and quality of execution services. Article 28 above 
aims to ensure that client orders are processed expeditiously and according to 
objective rules of precedence and priority. Article 28 also is intended to ensure 
that an investment firm takes active steps to facilitate executing client orders, 
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and that clients’ interests are not adversely affected by self-interested or 
negligent handling by a firm.230 
2. Level 2 and 3 Measures 
2 Level 2 measures includes the following articles of the MiFID II Delegated 
Regulation: Art 67 (client order handling: general principles), Art 68 
(aggregation and allocation of orders), Art 69 (aggregation and allocation of 
transactions for own account), and Art 70 (prompt fair and expeditious 
execution of client orders and publication of unexecuted client limit orders for 
shares traded on a trading venue). 
II. General principles (Art 28(1)) 
3 Investment firms authorised to execute orders on behalf of clients must 
implement procedures and arrangements which provide for the prompt, fair and 
expeditious execution of client orders, relative to other client orders or 
proprietary transactions of the investment firm. This differs from the best 
execution standard, which refers to the quality of execution of a client order 
relative to conditions in the wider marketplace.231 What is required under Art 28 
is timely execution, not best execution. Articles 67 through 70 of the MiFID II 
Delegated Regulation specify the conditions applicable to a firm’s procedures 
and arrangements to execute orders, which are to ensure prompt, fair and 
expeditious execution of client orders. Client orders must be promptly and 
accurately recorded and allocated under Art 67(1)(a) of the MiFID II Delegated 
Regulation. Firms must execute otherwise comparable client orders in 
accordance with the time an order is received (first come, first served under 
paragraph 2 of Art 28(1)). Orders must be executed sequentially and promptly 
unless the characteristics of the order or prevailing market conditions make this 
impracticable, or if the interests of the relevant client require otherwise.232 The 
characteristics of an order may also depend on the channel through which an 
order is received. Client orders should not be treated as otherwise comparable 
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232  Art 67(1)(b) MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
Martin Brenncke  80 
if they are received by different media, and if it would not be practicable to treat 
them sequentially.233 If a material difficulty relevant to the proper carrying out 
of an order arises, the firm must inform a retail client about it promptly upon 
becoming aware of the difficulty.234  
4 In order to avoid risk of abuse by an investment firm, Art 67(2) of the MiFID II 
Delegated Regulation requires that any financial instruments belonging to a 
client and funds belonging to a client received in settlement of an executed 
order must be promptly and correctly delivered to the account of the appropriate 
client. Article 67(3) of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation addresses the risk of 
market abuses and protects investors from the ‘front-running’ of their orders 
by prohibiting investment firms from misusing information relating to pending 
client orders, and requiring firms to take all reasonable steps to prevent such 
misuse by any relevant persons. This is clarified by Recital 110 of the MiFID II 
Delegated Regulation, which states that dealing on own account on the basis 
of the information of pending client orders should be considered misuse of 
information. 
III. Aggregation and allocation of client orders 
5 Article 68 and 69 of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation details the conditions 
under which client orders may be aggregated with other client orders or with 
the investment firm’s own transactions for the purposes of executing the orders, 
and how aggregated orders must be allocated. Conflicts of interest often arise 
when transactions are aggregated and when, at the settlement stage, the 
aggregated trades are allocated to accounts of the individual clients. The 
regulatory requirements apply the principle that only clients should gain an 
advantage from order aggregation.235 An order from a client or for a firm’s own 
account may only be aggregated with client orders if it is unlikely that the 
aggregation will work overall to the disadvantage of any client whose order is 
to be aggregated, and if the other conditions of Art 68(1) of the MiFID II 
Delegated Regulation are fulfilled. Investment firms must also establish and 
                                            
233  Recital 110 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
234  Art 67(1)(c) MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
235  Commission, Background note to draft MiFID I Implementing Directive, 6 February 2006, para 
7.8. 
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effectively implement an order allocation policy which provides for the fair 
allocation of aggregated orders and transactions. Investment firms which have 
aggregated transactions for own account with one or more client orders must 
not allocate the related trades in a way that is detrimental to a client (see 
Art 69(1) of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation). The reallocation of transactions 
will be considered to be detrimental to a client if unfair precedence is given to 
the relevant investment firm or to any particular client.236 
IV. Client limit orders (Art 28(2)) 
6 Article 28(2) introduces a pre-trade transparency requirement related to limit 
orders237 if the relevant shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market or 
traded on a trading venue. The article is a safeguard for market efficiency. The 
rule requires firms to publicize such client limit orders, and aims to ensure that 
investment firms do not withhold price-relevant information, embodied in the 
terms of an unexecuted client limit order, from other market participants.238 
Article 70 of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation specifies the requirement to 
publish unexecuted client limit orders. The obligation to make public 
unexecuted client limit orders does not apply if the client that placed the order 
expressly instructs otherwise or if the Member State has decided to waive this 
obligation in respect of large transactions (see sentence 4 of Art 28(2)).  
 
Article 29 – Obligations of investment firms when appointing tied agents 
1.   Member States shall allow an investment firm to appoint tied agents for the purposes of promoting 
the services of the investment firm, soliciting business or receiving orders from clients or potential 
clients and transmitting them, placing financial instruments and providing advice in respect of such 
financial instruments and services offered by that investment firm. 
2.   Member States shall require that where an investment firm decides to appoint a tied agent it remains 
fully and unconditionally responsible for any action or omission on the part of the tied agent when acting 
on behalf of the investment firm. Member States shall require the investment firm to ensure that a tied 
agent discloses the capacity in which he is acting and the investment firm which he is representing 
when contacting or before dealing with any client or potential client. 
                                            
236  Recital 109 MiFID II Delegated Regulation. 
237  Limit order is defined in Art 4(1)(16). 
238  Commission, MiFID I proposal, 19 November 2002, COM(2002) 625 final, 21. 
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Member States may allow, in accordance with Article 16(6), (8) and (9), tied agents registered in their 
territory to hold money and/or financial instruments of clients on behalf and under the full responsibility 
of the investment firm for which they are acting within their territory or, in the case of a cross border 
operation, in the territory of a Member State which allows a tied agent to hold client money. 
Member States shall require the investment firms to monitor the activities of their tied agents so as to 
ensure that they continue to comply with this Directive when acting through tied agents. 
3.   Tied agents shall be registered in the public register in the Member State where they are 
established. ESMA shall publish on its website references or hyperlinks to the public registers 
established under this Article by the Member States that decide to allow investment firms to appoint 
tied agents. 
Member States shall ensure that tied agents are only admitted to the public register if it has been 
established that they are of sufficiently good repute and that they possess the appropriate general, 
commercial and professional knowledge and competence so as to be able to deliver the investment 
service or ancillary service and to communicate accurately all relevant information regarding the 
proposed service to the client or potential client. 
Member States may decide that, subject to appropriate control, investment firms can verify whether the 
tied agents which they have appointed are of sufficiently good repute and possess the knowledge and 
competence referred to in the second subparagraph. 
The register shall be updated on a regular basis. It shall be publicly available for consultation. 
4.   Member States shall require that investment firms appointing tied agents take adequate measures 
in order to avoid any negative impact that the activities of the tied agent not covered by the scope of 
this Directive could have on the activities carried out by the tied agent on behalf of the investment firm. 
Member States may allow competent authorities to collaborate with investment firms and credit 
institutions, their associations and other entities in registering tied agents and in monitoring compliance 
of tied agents with the requirements of paragraph 3. In particular, tied agents may be registered by an 
investment firm, credit institution or their associations and other entities under the supervision of the 
competent authority. 
5.   Member States shall require that investment firms appoint only tied agents entered in the public 
registers referred to in paragraph 3. 
6.   Member States may adopt or retain provisions that are more stringent than those set out in this 
Article or add further requirements for tied agents registered within their jurisdiction. 
 
I. General Features 
Purpose 
1 MiFID II’s regime governing tied agents protects investors by requiring tied 
agents to possess certain professional requirements, and by stipulating that 
investment firms are fully and unconditionally responsible for activities carried 
out by its tied agents. 
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II. Comment 
2 Article 29(1) of MiFID II obliges Member States to allow investment firms to 
appoint tied agents. Article 4(1)(29) of MiFID II defines ‘tied agent’. A tied agent 
may only have one master, i.e. a tied agent may act on behalf of only one 
investment firm. If a person provides investment services on behalf of more 
than one investment firm, the person is not a tied agent but an investment firm, 
in accordance with Recital 99 of MiFID II. Investment firms may have multiple 
tied agents. The defining characteristic of the MiFID II regime governing tied 
agents is that the appointing investment firm remains fully and unconditionally 
responsible for its agents while acting on behalf of the investment firm (see 
paragraph 1 of Art 29(2)). An investment firm must monitor the activities of its 
tied agents and comply with MiFID II when acting through tied agents.239 An 
investment firm must also ensure that a tied agent discloses the capacity in 
which the agent is acting, and for what firm, to a client before the agent deals 
with that client (see paragraph 1 of Art 29(2)). Furthermore, an investment firm 
must monitor the activities of its tied agents in order to ensure that it complies 
with MiFID II when acting through the tied agents (see paragraph 3 of Art 29(2)). 
The permitted scope of activities which a tied agent may perform on behalf 
of an investment firm is exhaustively listed in Art 29(1).240 Yet, tied agents have 
the right to undertake activities not covered by MiFID II, for example, distributing 
insurance contracts.241 These other activities must not have any negative 
impact on the activities carried out by the tied agent on behalf of an investment 
firm under Art 29(4). 
3 A Member State can adopt or retain additional rules in relation to tied agents 
registered within its jurisdiction in accordance with Art 29(6). A Member State 
has discretion to allow tied agents registered in its territory to hold clients’ 
money and financial instruments within its territory, in accordance with the 
MiFID II asset protection regime. In the case of cross border activities, a 
Member State may also, but is not required to, allow a tied agent registered in 
its territory to hold a client’s money and financial instruments in the territory of 
                                            
239  Art 29(2) subpara 3. 
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Martin Brenncke  84 
another Member State which allows tied agents to hold the same (see 
paragraph 2 of Art 29(2)). A tied agent must be registered in a public register 
in the Member State where the agent is established (see Art 29(3)). A tied agent 
must be of sufficiently good repute and possess the professional standards set 
out in paragraph 2 of Art 29(3). Member States’ competent authorities should 
not register, or should withdraw the registration of, any tied agent where the 
activities performed by the agent indicate clearly that the tied agent has 
registered in a particular Member State for the purpose of evading the stricter 
standards in force in another Member State within the territory of which the 
agent intends to carry out, or does carry out, the greater part of his or her 
activities.242 
 
Article 30 – Transactions executed with eligible counterparties 
1.   Member States shall ensure that investment firms authorised to execute orders on behalf of clients 
and/or to deal on own account and/or to receive and transmit orders, may bring about or enter into 
transactions with eligible counterparties without being obliged to comply with the obligations under 
Article 24, with the exception of paragraphs 4 and 5, Article 25, with the exception of paragraph 6, 
Article 27 and Article 28(1) in respect of those transactions or in respect of any ancillary service directly 
relating to those transactions. 
Member States shall ensure that, in their relationship with eligible counterparties, investment firms act 
honestly, fairly and professionally and communicate in a way which is fair, clear and not misleading, 
taking into account the nature of the eligible counterparty and of its business. 
2.   Member States shall recognise as eligible counterparties for the purposes of this Article investment 
firms, credit institutions, insurance companies, UCITS and their management companies, pension 
funds and their management companies, other financial institutions authorised or regulated under 
Union law or under the national law of a Member State, national governments and their corresponding 
offices including public bodies that deal with public debt at national level, central banks and 
supranational organisations. 
Classification as an eligible counterparty under the first subparagraph shall be without prejudice to the 
right of such entities to request, either on a general form or on a trade-by-trade basis, treatment as 
clients whose business with the investment firm is subject to Articles 24, 25, 27 and 28. 
3.   Member States may also recognise as eligible counterparties other undertakings meeting pre-
determined proportionate requirements, including quantitative thresholds. In the event of a transaction 
where the prospective counterparties are located in different jurisdictions, the investment firm shall 
defer to the status of the other undertaking as determined by the law or measures of the Member State 
in which that undertaking is established. 
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Member States shall ensure that the investment firm, when it enters into transactions in accordance 
with paragraph 1 with such undertakings, obtains the express confirmation from the prospective 
counterparty that it agrees to be treated as an eligible counterparty. Member States shall allow the 
investment firm to obtain that confirmation either in the form of a general agreement or in respect of 
each individual transaction. 
4.   Member States may recognise as eligible counterparties third country entities equivalent to those 
categories of entities referred to in paragraph 2. 
Member States may also recognise as eligible counterparties third country undertakings such as those 
referred to in paragraph 3 on the same conditions and subject to the same requirements as those laid 
down in paragraph 3. 
5.   The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 89 to 
specify: 
(a) the procedures for requesting treatment as clients under paragraph 2; 
(b) the procedures for obtaining the express confirmation from prospective counterparties under 
paragraph 3; 
(c) the pre-determined proportionate requirements, including quantitative thresholds that would allow 
an undertaking to be considered to be an eligible counterparty under paragraph 3. 
 
I. General Features 
1. Purpose 
1 Many of the MiFID II’s rules of conduct do not apply when investment firms 
authorised to execute orders on behalf of clients, and/or to deal on own 
account, and/or to receive and transmit orders, may bring about or enter into 
transactions with eligible counterparties (see paragraph 1 of Art 30(1)). The 
reason MiFID II rules of conduct do not apply is that these market transactions 
are characterised by arm’s length. 
2. Level 2 and 3 Measures 
2 Level 2 measures related to Art 30 of MiFID II include Art 71 of the MiFID II 
Delegated Regulation (eligible counterparties). 
II. Comment 
3 The regime governing transactions between investment firms and eligible 
counterparties, as defined in Art 30(2) above, is only applicable in relation to 
investment services described by paragraph 1 of Art 30(1). For other 
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investment services, the rules of conduct with respect to professional clients 
will normally apply. Investment firms providing services which are mentioned in 
Art 30(1) to eligible counterparties are not obliged to comply with a number of 
MiFID II’s rules, including best execution (discussed further under Art 27 above) 
and client order-handling requirements aimed at protecting investors. 
Compared to its predecessor regulation, Art 24 of MiFID I, Art 30(1) of MiFID II 
extends some investor protection measures to eligible counterparties, 
primarily in relation to information obligations: Investment firms must (a) act 
honestly, fairly and professionally in their dealings with eligible counterparties, 
(b) communicate in a way which is fair, clear and not misleading, (c) fulfil the 
disclosure requirements under Arts 24(4) and (5), and (d) meet reporting 
obligations under Art 25(6). These rules are the result of experiences during 
the financial crisis, when minimal investor protections failed to achieve 
satisfactory outcomes for non-retail clients, and exist because the ability of 
some eligible counterparties to appreciate the risk of their investments is 
limited.243 The obligations of investment firms to assess the suitability and 
appropriateness of a product or service do not apply vis-à-vis eligible 
counterparties. 
4 Eligible counterparties are clients.244 Amplifications of the investor protection 
measures for eligible counterparties as set out in the MiFID II Delegated 
Regulation, that apply to all clients and potential clients, also apply to eligible 
counterparties. Investor protection measures in MiFID II delegated legislation 
that apply only to retail or professional clients (e.g. Art 44 of the MiFID II 
Delegated Regulation specifying the conditions for fair, clear and not 
misleading information) do not apply to eligible counterparties. 
5 Paragraph 1 of Art 30(2) lists entities that Member States must recognise as 
eligible counterparties. Municipalities and local public authorities are 
excluded from that list due to concerns arising from the sale of inappropriate or 
unsuitable complex instruments during the financial crisis. Article 30(3) and (4) 
refer to undertakings that Member States may recognise as eligible 
                                            
243  Recital 104 MiFID II; Commission, MiFID II proposal, 20 October 2011, COM(2011) 656 final, 
2. 
244  Recital 103 MiFID II. 
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counterparties. Eligible counterparties have the right to request, either generally 
or on a trade-by-trade basis, to be treated as clients whose business is subject 
to the full range of rules of conduct under paragraph 2 of Art 30(2). Article 30(2) 
and (3) are amplified by Art 71 of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation. Investment 
firms may also, on their own initiative, treat a client as a professional or retail 
client where that client might otherwise be classified as an eligible 
counterparty.245 
6 The actual impact of the increased level of investor protection granted to eligible 
counterparties by MiFID II on market practices under MiFID I is unclear. There 
has not yet been any guidance or further clarification by ESMA as to the 
meaning of acting honestly, fairly and professionally or communicating in a 
manner that is fair, clear and not misleading in relation to eligible 
counterparties. 
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